People v. Macoy Jr.

Facts:

Victor M. Macoy Jr. arrived drunk at his house in 1612 Gil Tudtud St., Lahinglahing, Mabolo, Cebu City. As he was carrying a musical instrument, his wife, Marilou M. Macoy called her son, Joglyn Macoy, to help his father. While walking toward the house, accused was complaining, in a low voice, about the muddy road leading to his house. He could not complain aloud because he was with his friends who worked at the Department of Public Services (DPS), the department responsible for the dumping of the soil on the road leading to his house.

When Joglyn went out to help his father, he commented that "foolish this DPS people damping [sic] soil which made the road muddy." The accused Victor angrily retorted in defense of his friends. Cresenciano Marikit, Marilou's younger brother arrived at the house and prevailed upon Joglyn to calm down and invited his nephew to a nearby store, thirty (30) meters from his house.

Meanwhile, accused went to his room and took from the aparador a belt bag, which contained a .38 caliber firearm. Accused Victor took the gun, tucked it in his waist and left the house. Marilou tried to persuade him not to leave the house, but accused walked out of the house.

A few minutes later, she heard a burst of gunfire and saw a commotion at the nearby store. When she arrived at the place, she saw her brother Cresenciano holding her husband, accused Victor, while her son Joglyn was being carried to a taxicab to be brought to the hospital. At the Cebu Chong Hua Hospital, the attending physician declared Joglyn Macoy dead on arrival.

Held:

Though accused categorically denied ownership of the .38 caliber revolver presented as prosecution evidence, prosecution witnesses Marilou Macoy, Cresenciano Marikit and Danilo Macasero positively identified the gun as the weapon used by the accused on the night in question. No ill motive has been established against these witnesses that might have prompted them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against him. "It is settled that when there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit. Testimonies of witnesses who have no motive or reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies should be given credence." Their narration of what exactly transpired on that fateful night was consistent and corroborative of each other's testimony.

His denial of the killing of his son can not prevail over his positive identification by prosecution witnesses. "It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative self-serving assertion, which deserves no weight in law.

With regard to accused's conviction for illegal possession of firearm, as aptly submitted by the Solicitor General, the penalty imposed on him should be modified because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294 amending Presidential Decree No. 1866. As held in People vs. Molina, People vs. Feloteo, and People vs. Narvasa, there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm. Such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed.

Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes involved in the instant case took place on October 9, 1995. As in the case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will have generally only prospective application. In cases, however, where the new penal law will be advantageous to the accused, the law may be given retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, Republic Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application.

Further, in line with this Court's ruling in People vs. Valdez, "in so far as this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law." The application of the cited provision of the new law would not be beneficial to the accused, as it would increase the penalty for parricide from reclusion perpetua to death.

The trial court, therefore, correctly found accused Victor Macoy, Jr. y Midal guilty of parricide. The crime has been duly established by the prosecution. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. The two penalties being indivisible, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.The court a quo properly meted the proper penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed decision with modification. As thus modified, the Court finds accused-appellant Victor Macoy, Jr. y Midal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P6,530.78 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.