Magalang v. Heretape

 Doctrine: The person who claims a better right of ownership to the property sought to be recovered must prove two things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.

Facts: Petitioners Spouses Kawasa Magalang and Mona Wahab were the owners of a 10-hectare property located at Salabaca, Ampatuan, Cotabato. On February 4, 1969, Kawasa Magalang and Lucibar Heretape executed a memorandum of agreement authorizing the latter "to occupy, cultivate and produce in a certain portion of TWO AND A HALF (2 1/2) hectares" of the lot for a period of one year and four months. 

In the early 1970s, Kawasa Magalang and his family were forced to evacuate the lot because of the Ilaga-Blackshirt conflict. Spouses Lucibar Heretape and Rosalina Funa, Spouses Nestor Heretape and Rosa Rogador, and Roberto Landero took advantage of the situation and usurped the whole 10-hectare lot. In connivance with these persons, Geodetic Engineer Eusebio Fortinez caused the subdivision of the lot into three parts.

Respondents answered that at the time Lucibar Heretape executed subject memorandum of agreement, Kawasa Magalang misrepresented himself as the lot owner. When Kawasa Magalang later abandoned the lot, a certain Pedro Deansin^** claiming to be the real owner, showed up and demanded that they (respondents) vacate the lot. As proofs of his ownership, Pedro Deansin showed them a Deed of Transfer of Rights.

Nestor Heretape, Lucibar Heretape's son, opted to buy 5 hectares from Pedro Deansin, corresponding to one-half of the lot. After the purchase, Nestor Heretape gave 2.5 hectares to his father Lucibar Heretape. In 1974, Pedro Deansin sold the remaining 5 hectares to Roberto Landero. 

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. CA reversed and dismissed the petition. MR was denied.

Issue: Are petitioners entitled to reconveyance of the entire Lot 1064 or the three subdivided lots 2238-B, Lot 2238-A, and Lot 1064-A?

Held: No. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. If fraud was indeed committed, it gives a complainant the right to seek reconveyance of the property from the registered owner or subsequent buyers.

The party seeking to recover the property must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she is entitled to the property, and that the adverse party has committed fraud in obtaining his or her title. 

Article 434 of the New Civil Code further provides what complainant must prove in order to recover the property:

Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.

In other words, the person who claims a better right of ownership to the property sought to be recovered must prove two things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.

CA did not err in dismissing petitioners' complaint for recovery of possession and ownership and/or declaration of nullity of acquisition of property.

Dispositive Portion: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated December 30, 2010 and Resolution dated October 6, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81939 are AFFIRMED.

Provincial Assessor v. Filipinas

 Doctrine: The exemption from real property taxes given to cooperatives applies regardless of whether or not the land owned is leased. This exemption benefits the cooperative's lessee. The characterization of machinery as real property is governed by the LGC and not the Civil Code.

Facts: Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. (Filipinas) is a private organization engaged in palm oil plantation with a total land area of more than 7,000 hectares of National Development Company (NDC) lands in Agusan del Sur. After the CARL was passed, NDC lands were transferred to CARL beneficiaries who formed themselves as the merged NDC-Guthrie Plantations, Inc. - NDC-Guthrie Estates, Inc. (NGPI-NGEI) Cooperatives. FILIPINAS entered into a lease contract agreement with NGPI-NGEI.

The Provincial-Assessor of Agusan del Sur assessed Filipinas  of real property taxes over the leased land, the roads constructed therein, as well as the company’s road equipment and mini haulers, which the Provincial Assessor considered as machineries subject to real property tax. 

The LBAA adopted Filipinas' claim that the basis for assessment should only be 98 trees. Although 1 hectare of land can accommodate 124 oil palm trees, the mountainous terrain of the plantation should be considered. Because of the terrain, not every meter of land can be fully planted with trees. The LBAA found that roads of any kind, as well as all their improvements, should not be taxed since these roads were intermittently used by the public. It resolved that the market valuation should be based on the laws of the DAR since the area is owned by the NDC, a quasi-governmental body of the Philippines. The LBAA exempted the low-cost housing units from taxation except those with a market value of more than P150,000.00 under the LGC. Finally, the LBAA considered the road equipment and mini haulers as movables that are vital to Filipinas' business.

Filipinas appealed before the CBAA. The Board decided to set aside the LBAA decision. CBAA denied the MR filed by the Provincial Assessor. 

The Provincial Assessor filed a Petition for Review before the CA which sustained the CBAA’s decision. The CA held that the land owned by NGPI-NGEI, which Filipinas has been leasing, cannot be subjected to real property tax since these are owned by cooperatives that are tax-exempt under the LGC. 

Issues: whether the exemption privilege of NGPI-NGEI from payment of real property tax extends to respondent Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. as lessee of the parcel of land owned by cooperatives; and whether respondent's road equipment and mini haulers are movable properties and have not been immobilized by destination for real property taxation.

Held: 

First issue: NGPI-NGEI, as the owner of the land being leased by respondent, falls within the purview of the law. Section 234 of the LGC exempts all real property owned by cooperatives without distinction. Nothing in the law suggests that the real property tax exemption only applies when the property is used by the cooperative itself. Similarly, the instance that the real property is leased to either an individual or corporation is not a ground for withdrawal of tax exemption.

The roads that respondent constructed became permanent improvements on the land owned by the NGPI-NGEI by right of accession. Despite the land being leased by respondent when the roads were constructed, the ownership of the improvement still belongs to NGPI-NGEI. As provided under Article 440 and 445 of the Civil Code, the land is owned by the cooperatives at the time respondent built the roads. Hence, whatever is incorporated in the land, either naturally or artificially, belongs to the NGPI-NGEI as the landowner.

Although the roads were primarily built for respondent's benefit, the roads were also being used by the members of NGPI and the public. Furthermore, the roads inured to the benefit of NGPI-NGEI as owners of the land not only by right of accession but through the express provision in the lease agreement.

Second issue: The road equipment and mini haulers shall be considered as real property, subject to real property tax.

Section 199(o) of the Local Government Code defines "machinery" as real property subject to real property tax. Article 415(5) of the New Civil Code defines "machinery" as that which constitutes an immovable property.

Section 199(o) of the Local Government prevails over Article 415(5) of the Civil Code. In Manila Electric Company:

As between the Civil Code, a general law governing property and property relations, and the Local Government Code, a special law granting local government units the power to impose real property tax, then the latter shall prevail. 

Respondent is engaged in palm oil plantation. Thus, it harvests fruits from palm trees for oil conversion through its milling plant. By the nature of respondent's business, transportation is indispensable for its operations.

Petitioner is correct in claiming that the phrase pertaining to physical facilities for production is comprehensive enough to include the road equipment and mini haulers as actually, directly, and exclusively used by respondent to meet the needs of its operations in palm oil production. Moreover, "mini-haulers are farm tractors pulling attached trailers used in the hauling of seedlings during planting season and in transferring fresh palm fruits from the farm [or] field to the processing plant within the plantation area." The indispensability of the road equipment and mini haulers in transportation makes it actually, directly, and exclusively used in the operation of respondent's business.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 26, 2007 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74060 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the road equipment and the mini haulers should be assessed with real property taxes.

Santos v. Santos

DOCTRINE: A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.

FACTS: On July 27, 2007, RTC Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos, had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on  June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.

Ricardo alleged that Celerina allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995 to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again. Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his RTC petition since Celerina left.  He believed that she had passed away.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.

Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead.

CA dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the CA, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. Celerina filed MR but it was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment

HELD: The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.

The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears.

The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.

Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.

The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.  Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.

In re: Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan

DOCTRINE: In Grande v. Antonio, we held that "the use of the word 'may' in [Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255] readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word 'may' is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children. 

FACTS: Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote bore children out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky O. Tinitigan in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She did not register the birth of her children to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City.

When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both children. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the late registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote after submitting proof that the NSO has no record of both births on file.

However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office. The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City state the following:

1. Birth Certificate with Registry No. 2008-21709:

a. Name: Avee Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan;

b. Date of Birth: June 4, 2008;

c. Place of Birth: EUP Family Care Clinic, Holy Cross Agdao Davao City;

d. Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan.

2. Birth Certificate with Registry No. 2011-28329:

a. Name: Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan;

b. Date of Birth: August 14, 2011

c. Place of Birth: EUP Family Care Clinic, Holy Cross Agdao Davao City;

d. Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan.

Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for containing erroneous entries. RTC ruled in favor of Barcelote. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not cancelling the certificates of live birth of Barcelote’s children

HELD: We grant the petition. Upon the effectivity of RA 9255, the provision that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother was retained, with an added provision that they may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father. Thus, Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)

In Grande v. Antonio, we held that "the use of the word 'may' in [Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255] readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word 'may' is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children. 

The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The use of the word "shall" underscores its mandatory character. The discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR.

Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation

 DOCTRINE: a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

FACTS: Petitioner Vinzons-Chato was then the CIR while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack." 

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. RTC denied the motion. The cse was elevated to the CA, however, the same was dismissed.

ISSUE: Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

HELD: The Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

The complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only. 

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. 

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. 

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Manila Public School Teachers' Association v. Garcia

DOCTRINE: all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

FACTS: Under the GSIS Act, the employee-member and the employer-agency are required by law to pay monthly contributions to the system. The share of the employer ("GS," or government share) is sourced from the national budget, while that of the employee ("PS," or personal share) is automatically deducted by the former from the employee's salary. The employer is mandated to remit the GS and PS directly to the GSIS within the first 10 days of the calendar month following the month to which the contributions apply. 

One of the changes made in R.A. 8291 was the increase in the employer's contribution from 9.5% to 12%. However, there was no concomitant increase in the budget appropriation. As a result, DepEd was unable to pay GSIS the equivalent of the 2.5% increase in the employer's share. 

In the meantime, GSIS issued the assailed Resolutions, to wit: GSIS Resolutions Nos. 238, 90, and 179, which respectively embody the Claims and Loans Interdependency Policy, Premium-Based Policy, and Automatic Policy Loan and Policy Lapse.

These Resolutions were not published in a newspaper of general circulation and were enforced before they were even filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions are valid.

RULING: The policies are invalid due to lack of publication.

As early as 1986, the Court in Tanada v. Tuvera already laid down a definitive interpretation of Article 2 of the Civil Code:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. 

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. GSIS Resolutions Nos. 238, 90, and 179, which respectively embody the Claims and Loans Interdependency Policy, Premium-Based Policy, and Automatic Policy Loan and Policy Lapse, are declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT.

Navarro v. Domagtoy

 DOCTRINE: a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

FACTS: The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.  With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

ISSUE: Is the joint affidavit sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death

HELD: No, Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."

Buenaventura v. CA

DOCTRINE: in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.

FACTS: These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. 

The RTC declared the marriage null and void ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 50 of the FC applies.

HELD: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.

With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of the parties’ son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

Javier v. Lucero

DOCTRINE: Under the new Civil Code, article 290 support also includes the education of the person to be supported "until he complete his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation even beyond the age of majority.”

Under the New Civil Code articles 303 and 921 the wife forfeits her husband’s support after "she has accused (him) of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, and the accusation has been found to be false."

FACTS: At the time of the marriage between plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier, they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier Junior. Alfredo Javier left for the United States. His wife Salud R. Arca, who is from Tanza, Cavite, chose to live with defendant’s parents at Naic, Cavite. But for certain incompatibility of character, plaintiff Salud R. Arca had found it necessary to leave defendant’s parents’ abode and transfer her residence to Tanza, Cavite — her native place. Alfredo Javier brought an action for divorce against plaintiff Salud R. Arca before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA. The Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment decreeing dissolution of the marriage of Salud R. Arca end Alfredo Javier, and granting the latter a decree of divorce dated April 9, 1941. Thereupon, the evidence discloses that some time in 1946 defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines but went back to the United States.

Alfredo Javier arrived in the Philippines armed with two decrees of divorce — one against his first wife Salud R. Arca and the other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis — issued by the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo Javier married Maria Odvina.

At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by the City Fiscal of Manila. However, defendant Alfredo Javier was acquitted.

In an action for alimony, the respondent judge ordered Alfredo Javier to give a monthly allowance of P60 to his wife Salud R. Arca and their son Alfredo Javier Jr.

The husband filed a notice of appeal. Meanwhile the wife and the son presented a motion for "support pendente lite" "even pending the final determination of the case on appeal." The judge directed Alfredo Javier to pay the monthly pensions notwithstanding the pendency of his appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Alfredo Javier, Jr. is entitled for support.

HELD: Under the new Civil Code, article 290 support also includes the education of the person to be supported "until he complete his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation even beyond the age of majority" and on the basis of this article support was granted to Alfredo Javier Junior. Said the Court, "while it is true that plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior, who was born on December 2, 1931, has reached the age of majority on December 2, 1952, yet, under the last part of article 290 of the new Civil Code, support may be given him even beyond the age of majority in order to enable him to complete his education, for some trade or profession."

Under the New Civil Code articles 303 and 921 the wife forfeits her husband’s support after "she has accused (him) of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, and the accusation has been found to be false." If bigamy is such a crime, and if her accusation had been found to be false, Salud Arca would lose her privilege. But the accusation was not "found to be false." Admittedly, he married a third time without the first marriage having been dissolved; but he was cleared of the bigamy charge for lack of criminal intent, inasmuch as he believed his divorce obtained in the U. S., had already ended his first marriage to Salud R. Arca. Such acquittal is no different from an acquittal on reasonable doubt, which in our opinion, and in the opinion of a member of the Code Commission that framed the New Civil Code, would not be ground to forfeit her right to support.

Of course, the question whether Alfredo Javier’s prosecution for bigamy and subsequent acquittal extinguished his obligation to maintain his complaining spouse will definitely be decided when the main case is reviewed on appeal. Other aspects of the issue could then undoubtedly be the subject of research and elucidation. Nevertheless we briefly explain our first impressions or provisional conclusion in the task of examining the alleged misuse by respondent judge of his prerogatives. It is markworthy that the son has not forfeited his right to support.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes

Facts: Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name “Amay Bisaya,” alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: “of course.” Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant. At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party (“huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang”). Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. out of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. 

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past 20 years. Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly. Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the “captain waiter,” to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart. As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. When Ms. Lim turned around she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached. Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity. However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: “alam ninyo, hindi ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.” She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.

According to Dr. Violeta Filart, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung. Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting. She ignored Mr. Reyes, She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the ruling of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in its decision

Held: Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. 

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.” The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. 

Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.