Republic v. Cortez

Facts: A Petition for Mandamus was filed by NECU and NEWU with RTC QC praying that the NAPOCOR be ordered to release the COLA and AA allegedly withheld from them. NECU and NEWU pointed to this Court's pronouncements in De Jesus v. COA, Philippine Ports Authority Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 v. COA, and MWSS v. Bautista, et al. They believed that they were among the government employees whose COLA and AA were not factually integrated into their basic salary upon the implementation of RA No. 6758. The trial court granted their petition. 

OSG and then SBM Andaya separately filed Petitions for Certiorari with the SC. The Court granted the petitions. Respondents’ COLA and AA were already factually integrated into their basic salaries. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the Motion for Reconsideration should be granted.

Held: No. Those who were hired after the implementation of RA No. 6758, or after July 1, 1989, did not receive a lesser compensation package than those who were hired before July 1, 1989. To emphasize, respondents NECU's and NEWU's COLA and AA were integrated into their basic salary by virtue of Section 12 of RA No. 6758. Section 12 has never been ineffective or rendered unconstitutional. Thus, all allowances not covered by the exceptions to Section 12 are presumed to have been integrated into the basic standardized pay. The receipt of a transition allowance is not proof that only those who were hired before July 1, 1989 received their COLA and AA. As this Court explained in its February 7, 2017 Decision, the transition allowance was given only to comply with the non-diminution clause of the law. It was never meant as an additional compensation to the standardized pay.

Nazareno v. Maersk FIlipinas Crewing Inc., et al

Facts: Nazareno was hired by Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. (MCI) as Chief Officer for and in behalf of its foreign principal Elite Shipping A/S on board vessel M/V Artkis Hope for a period of 6 months.

The vessel was berthed at Port Belem, Brazil to load timber. While petitioner was checking the last bundle of timber to be loaded, he suddenly lost his balance and fell at a height of 2m. He landed on the timber and injured his right shoulder. Due to the pain he felt in his right shoulder, he was later examined at Philadelphia, U.S.A. and was considered not fit for work.  It was recommended that petitioner should be confined for thorough evaluation and further tests, such as MRI. Petitioner was also advised to see an Orthopedic Surgeon and/or a Neurologist. However, petitioner was not permitted to disembark as there was no one available to replace him. Petitioner was also brought at the Ulsan Hyundai Hospital at Ulsan, South Korea where he was treated and given medication for his “frozen right shoulder.” He was also advised to undergo physical therapy. Consequently, petitioner was declared unfit to work and was recommended to be signed off from duty. When petitioner was repatriated to Manila, he reported to MCI which referred him to MCM where he underwent PT program under Dr. Periquet 3 times a week. Dr. Campana issued a Medical Certificate stating that after after treatment and physical therapy, petitioner was fit for work. 

However, after almost 2 months of therapy, petitioner did not notice any improvement. He informed Dr. Periquet that when he was in Philadelphia, U.S.A., he was advised to consult a neurologist and undergo MRI. When Dr. Periquet ignored him, he consulted another doctor.  Petitioner underwent a series of treatment for his “frozen shoulder of the right arm” from Dr. Tan in his Chiropractic Clinic. Petitioner consulted Dr. Santiago, a Neurologist at MMC. Dr. Santiago concluded that petitioner will no longer be able to function as in his previous disease-free state and that his condition would hamper him from operating as chief officer of a ship. Petitioner was also examined by Dr. Vicaldo who diagnosed petitioner to be suffering from Parkinson’s disease and a frozen right shoulder (secondary), with an “Impediment Grade VII (41.8%). He concluded that petitioner is unfit to work as a seafarer.

Petitioner sought payment of his disability benefits and medical allowance from respondents, but was refused. He filed a complaint to the NLRC. The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed with modifications the decision of the LA, deleting the grant of sickness allowance. Respondents filed an MR but it was denied. Respondents filed before the CA which was granted. 

Issue: Whether the CA committed grave error in reversing and setting aside the decisions of both the LA a quo and the NLRC.

Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the CA relied on the provisions of Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC and the ruling of this Court in German Marine Agencies, Inc. v NLRC, in concluding that the disability of a seafarer can only be determined by a company-designated physician and not the seafarer’s own doctors.

The rule is that under Section 20-B (3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, it is mandatory for a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits. However, in submitting himself to examination by the company-designated physician, a claimant does not automatically bind himself to the medical report issued by the company-designated physician; neither are the labor tribunals and the courts bound by said medical report. Its inherent merit will be weighed and duly considered. Moreover, the claimant may dispute the medical report issued by the company-designated physician by seasonably consulting another physician. The medical report issued by said physician will also be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court based on its inherent merits.

National Transmission Corp. v. COA

Facts: Petitioner TransCo is a government instrumentality created under EPIRA Law, operating and managing the power transmission system that links power plants to electric distribution utilities nationwide. Its concession was awarded to the NGCP. 

Agulto was a regular employee of Petitioner received his separation benefits (P656,597.50) pursuant to the petitioner’s Early Separation Program. During post-audit, Supervising Auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance disallowing the amount of P22,965.81 from Agulto's separation benefits as said amount pertained to the period during which Agulto's employment status was still contractual. Petitioner appealed before the COA Director arguing that the payment of separation benefits to contractual employees was lawful as it was in accordance with the EPIRA Law, the Corporation Code, and the Board Resolutions of petitioner. COA Director partially granted the appeal  by exempting Agulto from liability since he received his separation benefits in good faith. COA Chairperson disapproved the decision of COA Director.

Issue: Whether COA-CP committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing a portion of Agulto’s separation benefits and in finding him and the members of petitioner TransCo's Board of Directors solidarily liable.

Held: In this case, since there was no proof that Agulto's appointment was duly approved or attested to by the CSC, the disallowance of the amount of P22,965.81 was valid and proper. Thus, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COA-CP is sustaining the disallowance.

The disallowed amount, however, need not be refunded by the members of petitioner TransCo's Board of Directors as well as by Agulto, following the ruling of the Court in National Transmission Corporation -

The Court, nevertheless, finds that TransCo and Miranda be excused from refunding the disallowed amount notwithstanding the propriety of the ND in question. In view of TransCo's reliance on Lopez, which the Court now abandons, the Court grants TransCo's petition pro hac vice and absolved it from any liability in refunding the disallowed amount.

On another note, even if the ND is to be upheld, Miranda should not be solidarily liable to refund the same. In Silang v. COA, the Court had ruled that passive recipients of the disallowed disbursements who acted in good faith, are absolved from refunding the same. x x x

Rosales v. New ANJH Enterprises

Facts: Respondent New ANJH Enterprises (New ANJH) is a sole proprietorship owned by respondent Noel Awayan. Petitioners are its former employees who worked as machine operators, drivers, helpers, lead and boiler men. 

Allegedly due to dwindling capital, Noel wrote the Director of DOLE Region IV-A regarding New ANJH's impending cessation of operations and the sale of its assets to respondent NH Oil Mill Corporation as well as the termination of 33 employees by reason thereof. Noel signed a Deed of Sale selling the equipment, machines, tools and/or other devices being used by New ANJH Enterprises to NH Oil. Noel met with the 33 affected employees to inform them of his plan and then later gave the employees uniformly-worded Notices informing them of the cessation of operations of New ANJH and the sale of its assets to a corporation. Noel also offered the employees, including petitioners, their separation pay. 

Respondents New ANJH and Noel filed before the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch a Letter Request for Intervention. Petitioners received their separation benefits and signed their respective Quitclaims and Release and check vouchers. LA Guan declared the “labor dispute” between New ANJH and petitioners as dismissed with prejudice on ground of settlement. 

Petitioners however filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that while New ANJH stopped its operations, it resumed its operations as NH Oil using the same machineries and with the same owners and management. ELA Santos found the petitioners had been illegally dismissed. NLRC denied respondents’ appeal. NLRC issued another decision reversing its earlier decision on the ground that it was barred by the Orders issued by LA Guan under the doctrine of res judicata. CA affirmed the NLRC Resolutions.

Issue: Whether the petitioners’ complaint for illegal dismissal was already barred by res judicata.

Held: No. Article 219 (previously Article 212) of the Labor Code defines a "labor dispute" as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." As separation pay concerns a term and condition of employment, Noel's request to be guided in the payment thereof is clearly a labor dispute under the Labor Code.

Guagua National Colleges v. CA

 

Facts: Under Section 5(2) of RA No. 6728 (Government Assistance To Students and Teachers In Private Education Act), 70% of the increase in tuition fees shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of the teaching and non-teaching personnel. Pursuant to this provision, the petitioner imposed a 7% increase of its tuition fees for school year 2006-2007.

In order to save the depleting funds of the petitioner's Retirement Plan, its Board of Trustees approved the funding of the retirement program out of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the tuition fee increases. Respondents GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor Union challenged the petitioner's unilateral decision by claiming that the increase violated Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728.

The parties referred the matter to voluntary arbitration. Voluntary Arbitrator Bacungan rendered his decision in favor of GNC. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Extension to the CA which was granted. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and it was acted on by the CA.

Issue: Whether the CA is acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction considering that the decision of the VA had already become final and executory.

Held: No. Accordingly, the decisions and awards of Voluntary Arbitrators, albeit immediately final and executory, remained subject to judicial review in appropriate cases through petitions for certiorari. 

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1- 95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.

This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.

The remedy of appeal by petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court became available to the parties aggrieved by the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panels of Arbitrators.

Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Sto. Tomas

Facts: On May 31, 2002, a petition for certification election was filed by private respondent HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS, alleging that: PIGLAS is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with DOLE, representing HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS; HCCS is a private educational institution duly registered and operating under Philippine laws; there are approximately 120 teachers and employees comprising the proposed appropriate bargaining unit; and HCCS is unorganized, there is no collective bargaining agreement or a duly certified bargaining agent or a labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the proposed bargaining unit within one year prior to the filing of the petition. Among the documents attached to the petition were the certificate of affiliation with PIGLAS-KAMAO issued by BLR, charter certificate issued by PIGLAS-KAMAO, and certificate of registration of HCCS-TELU as a legitimate labor organization issued by the DOLE. 

Petitioner HCCS consistently noted that it is a parochial school with a total of 156 employees. It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 245 of the Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election. Private respondent, however, countered that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that some of the employees included in the petition for certification election holds managerial and supervisory positions.

Med-Arbiter Daquigan denied the petition for certification election on the ground that the unit which private respondent sought to represent is inappropriate. Private respondent appealed before the SOLE, who ruled against the dismissal of the petition and directed the conduct of two separate certification elections for the teaching and the non-teaching personnel. Petitioner filed an MR which was denied. Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. CA eventually dismissed the petition. MR was also denied. 

Issues: 

1. Whether the CA erred in holding that the case in Toyota Motor Phil. Co., v. Toyota Motor Phil. Co., Labor Union does not apply in the case at bar despite the commingling of both supervisory or managerial and rank-and-file employees in the respondent union; and 
2. Whether the CA erred in its conflicting ruling allowing the conduct of certification election by upholding that the respondent union represented a bargaining unit despite its own findings that there is no mutuality of interest between the members of respondent union applying the test laid down in the case of UP v. Ferrer-Calleja.

Held: 

1. No. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold true under the law and rules governing the instant case. The petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) was applied. In contrast, D.O. No. 9 is applicable in the petition for certification election of private respondent as it was filed on May 31, 2002.

2. No. The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit. In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.

The purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain the majority of the employees’ choice of an appropriate bargaining unit – to be or not to be represented by a labor organization and, if in the affirmative case, by which one.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles

Facts: Petitioner is a recruitment and placement agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent Joy C. Cabiles submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan. Joy’s application was accepted. She was required to pay a placement fee when she signed the employment contract. 

Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal on June 26, 1997. She alleged in her employment contract that she agreed to work as a quality control for one year, however, she was asked to work as a cutter. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated. Wacoal deducted her salary to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

Joy filed a complained with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal, claiming she was illegally dismissed. Petitioner also asserted that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to Pacific. Pacific moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims.

The LA dismissed Joy’s complaint. On appeal, the NLRC declared Joy was illegally dismissed. It also denied the agency’s MR. CA affirmed the NLRC decision.

Issue: Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the NLRC decision.

Held: No. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

Employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work. They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards. Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is “tempered with the employee’s right to security of tenure.” Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance assessment. In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to support such allegations.

Dumapis v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.

Facts: In NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-11-0607-00, LA Tabingan dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC reversed the decision insofar as to Dumapis, Tundagui, and Liagao. These three were illegally dismissed. The dismissal of the other 9 were affirmed as having committed highgrading. CA affirmed the decision. SC affirmed the decision in 2008 and in addition, required Lepanto to pay double costs. 

The LA issued the corresponding writ of execution. Petitioners thens ought a recomputation of this award. Lepanto moved to quash the writ of execution. Meantime, petitioners moved for another recomputation of the monetary award to include the salary increases allegedly granted them per the CBA. The LA recomputed the award of backwages and separation pay to include the incremental salary increase pursuant to the CBA but only until the date when the CA issued its decision. 

In their Partial Motion for Reconsideration/Memorandum of Appeal, petitioners asserted that the cut-off date for the computation of the award was when the SC’s decision  in 2008 became final and executory. NLRC directed LA to compute petitioners' backwages and separation pay from the date they were illegally dismissed up to the finality of SC’s decision. CA nullified the NLRC ruling and ordered the reinstatement of the earlier NLRC decision.

Issue: What is the correct formula for computing the award of separation pay and backwages to petitioners?

Held: In CICM Mission Seminaries, et al. v. Perez citing Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman, the Court through the Second Division laid down the rule that the award of separation pay and backwages for illegally dismissed employees should be computed from the time they got illegally dismissed until the finality of the decision ordering payment of their separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement. Plainly, it does not matter if the delay caused by an appeal was brought about by the employer or by the employee. The rule is, if the LA's decision, which granted separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, is appealed by any party, the employer-employee relationship subsists and until such time when decision becomes final and executory, the employee is entitled to all the monetary awards awarded by the LA.

The award shall be computed from September 22, 2000, when they were illegally dismissed up to November 25, 2008, when this Court's Decision dated August 13, 2008 in G.R. No. 163210 became final and executory. The amount of P75,000.00 which petitioners had already received shall be deducted from the total amount due them.

SME Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman

Facts: Respondent employees were employees of SME Bank. Originally, the principal shareholders and corporate directors of the bank were Agustin and De Guzman. In June 2001, SME Bank experienced financial difficulties. To remedy the situation, the bank officials proposed its sale to Samson. 

Espiritu, then the general manager of SME Bank, held a meeting with all the employees of the head office and of the Talavera and Muñoz branches of SME Bank and persuaded them to tender their resignations, with the promise that they would be rehired upon reapplication. His directive was allegedly done at the behest of petitioner Olga Samson. Relying on this representation, Elicerio, Ricardo, Fidel, Simeon, Jr., and Liberato tendered their resignations. As it turned out, respondent employees, except for Simeon, Jr., were not rehired. Respondent-employees demanded the payment of their respective separation pays, but their requests were denied.

Respondent-employees filed a complaint before the NLRC-Regional Arbitration Branch No. III and sued spouses Abelardo, the Samson Group, and Agustin and De Guzman  for for unfair labor practice; illegal dismissal; illegal deductions; underpayment; and nonpayment of allowances, separation pay and 13th month pay. The LA ruled that the buyer of an enterprise is not bound to absorb its employees, unless there is an express stipulation to the contrary. However, he also found that respondent employees were illegally dismissed. NLRC denied the MR. CA affirmed the NLRC.

Issue: Whether the employees were illegally dismissed and, if so, which of the parties are liable for the claims of the employees and the extent of the reliefs that may be awarded to these employees.

Held: Yes, the employees were illegally dismissed. The law permits an employer to dismiss its employees in the event of closure of the business establishment. However, the employer is required to serve written notices on the worker and the Department of Labor at least one month before the intended date of closure. Moreover, the dismissed employees are entitled to separation pay, except if the closure was due to serious business losses or financial reverses. However, to be exempt from making such payment, the employer must justify the closure by presenting convincing evidence that it actually suffered serious financial reverses.

In this case, the records do not support the contention of SME Bank that it intended to close the business establishment. On the contrary, the intention of the parties to keep it in operation is confirmed by the provisions of the Letter Agreements requiring Agustin and De Guzman to guarantee the "peaceful transition of management of the bank" and to appoint "a manager of [the Samson Group’s] choice x x x to oversee bank operations."

In Simeon, Jr.’s case, he was made to resign, then rehired under conditions that were substantially less than what he was enjoying before the illegal termination occurred. Thus, for the second time, he involuntarily resigned from his employment. Clearly, this case is illustrative of constructive dismissal, an act prohibited under our labor laws. 

SME Bank, Eduardo M. Agustin, Jr. and Peregrin de Guzman, Jr. are liable for illegal dismissal. The settled rule is that an employer who terminates the employment of its employees without lawful cause or due process of law is liable for illegal dismissal. None of the parties dispute that SME Bank was the employer of respondent employees. The fact that there was a change in the composition of its shareholders did not affect the employer-employee relationship between the employees and the corporation, because an equity transfer affects neither the existence nor the liabilities of a corporation. Thus, SME Bank continued to be the employer of respondent employees notwithstanding the equity change in the corporation. This outcome is in line with the rule that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of its individual shareholders or members, such that a change in the composition of its shareholders or members would not affect its corporate liabilities.

del Rosario v. ABS-CBN

Facts: ABS-CBN is a domestic corporation that owns a wide network of television and radio stations. Their franchise expired on May 5, 2020. During the production of shows and the live coverage of events, ABS-CBN hired three different groups of employees to work in such productions.

Sometime in 2002, ABS-CBN adopted a system known as the Internal Job Market (IJM) System. The IJM scheme led to the creation of a work pool of accredited technical or creative manpower who offered their services for a fee. The workers were regarded as independent contractors, not regular employees. The workers were asked to sign a contract that would place them all under the IJM Work Pool. They were included in the pool without their consent or over their vehement objections. Each of the workers was given an hourly rate. They did not receive overtime pay, premium pay, and holiday pay for the work they rendered during rest days, special holidays, and regular holidays. 

The workers formed the ABS-CBN IJM Workers' Union. They started demanding recognition as regular employees. Thus, in the later part of 2002 up to the first quarter of 2003, the workers filed cases for regularization before the LA. They were made to sign a document which relegated the workers to mere talents. 

Sometime in 2007, ABS-CBN required the workers in ABS-CBN Corporation v. Payonan, et at. to sign an employment contract, which stated that they were "freelance employees.” Those who refused to sign were deprived of their benefits.  

In May 2010, ABS-CBN purportedly coerced the union members to sign a contract and waive their claims for regularization. Because the workers refused to comply, ABS-CBN effected a series of mass dismissals of workers on various dates from June to September 2010. Those who refused to sign the said contract were terminated from their employment. No notice of termination was given to the workers. These series of summary dismissals sprung numerous complaints filed before the LA for illegal dismissal with claims for monetary benefits, ranging from overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, 13th month pay, night shift differential, and payment of moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitions should be dismissed on procedural grounds due to the failure of the workers to file a motion for reconsideration against the NLRC ruling in G.R. No. 222057;
2. Whether or not the workers are guilty of forum shopping by instituting  the  case   for  illegal  dismissal,   notwithstanding the pendency of the regularization case;
3. Whether or not the ruling of the Court in Jalog, et al. v. NLRC, should be applied in resolving the instant petitions due to the similarity of facts and circumstances between the said case and the instant petitions;
4. Whether or not the workers are regular employees of ABS-CBN;
5. Whether or not the workers in G.R. Nos. 202495 & 202497 and G.R. No. 202481 are entitled to the benefits under the CBA with ABS-CBN; and
6. Whether or not the workers  in G.R.  No.  222057;   G.R.   No.   224879;   G.R.  No.   225874; G.R. No. 219125; G.R. No. 225101; and G.R. No. 210165 were illegally dismissed by ABS-CBN.

Held:

Procedural Issues:

1. The failure to file a motion for reconsideration shall not be deemed fatal to the cause of the workers. As a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition for filing a special civil action for certiorari. One exception is: where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court. The issues raised before the NLRC, which pertain to the existence of an employment relationship between ABS-CBN and the workers and the fact of illegal dismissal, were the very same questions raised in the special civil action for certiorari before the CA. 

2. The workers are not guilty of forum shopping. Although it is true that the parties in the regularization and the illegal dismissal cases are identical, the reliefs sought and the causes of action are different. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to' ascertain whether the same evidence would support both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would support both actions, then they are considered the same; a judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent action. This is absent here. The facts or the pieces of evidence that would determine whether the workers were illegally dismissed are not the same as those that would support their clamor for regularization.

Substantive Issues:

3. Jalog is not binding on the workers. Essentially, the phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere literally means "stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled." This legal concept ordains that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. Simply stated, like cases ought to be decided alike.

4. The workers are employees of ABS-CBN. In ascertaining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the Court has invariably adhered to the four-fold test, which pertains to: (i) the selection and engagement of the employee; (ii) the payment of wages; (iii) the power of dismissal; and (iv) the power of control over the employee's conduct, or the so-called "control test.” In the case of Begino, the Court has ruled that  that cameramen/editors and reporters are employees of ABS-CBN following the four-fold test. The Begino ruling is applicable here.

5. The workers are regular employees. The Labor Code classifies four (4) kinds of employees, as follows: (i) regular employees, or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; (ii) project employees, or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the employees' engagement; (iii) seasonal employees, or those who perform services which are seasonal in nature, and whose employment lasts during the duration of the season; and (iv) casual employees, or those who are not regular, project, or seasonal employees. Jurisprudence added a fifth kind — fixed-term employees, or those hired only for a definite period of time. 

The principal test is whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project.

6. The workers are not program/project employees of ABS-CBN. The business of creating and producing television shows is heavily dependent on viewer preference and advancements in modern technology. Given the numerous television programs aired in a network, it is not surprising to find one that would last for many years, and one that is terminated in a short span of months. Indeed, it is economical for the broadcasting networks to maintain shows which earn, and to end those which do not. More so, it is nearly impossible to predict beforehand the success and 'the lifespan of each program.

7. The IJM System of ABS-CBN is a work pool of regular employees. The Court finds that a work pool indeed existed, but its members, consistent with the rulings in Begino and Nazareno, were regular employees, and not independent contractors.

8. The workers in the regularization cases are entitled to all the benefits under the CBA. In Fulache v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. and Nazareno, the Court categorically declared that the workers, who were production assistants, cameramen, assistant editor/teleprompter operators, video editors, and VTR operators, being regular employees of ABS-CBN, are part of the bargaining unit of ABS-CBN's rank-and-file employees. As such, they are entitled to the CBA benefits as a matter of law and contract.

9. The workers in the illegal dismissal cases are entitled to reinstatement and backwages and other benefits. The necessary consequence of a declaration that the workers are regular employees is the correlative rule that the employer shall not dismiss them except for a just or authorized cause provided in the Labor Code. This is the essence of the tenurial security guaranteed by the law: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to his full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary Equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement."

New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. NLRC; LA Olairez v. Judge Sison

DOCTRINES: There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.

FACTS:

In G.R. No. 85939

Private respondents were employees of Pangasinan Review, Inc. (PRI), a corporation engaged in the business of printing, bookbinding and publishing newspapers whose corporate life legally expired on October 27, 1982 after fifty years of corporate existence. However, it actually continued its business operations until it was advised by the SEC in a letter dated January 10, 1985. 

The Board of Directors minus Zamuco and Mrs. Fernandez who were then absent, acting as a Board of Liquidators of the company passed a resolution conveying corporate properties of the defunct PRI, to the NPRI which had been newly incorporated. 

The nineteen private respondents, among others, filed with the Chairman of the Board of Liquidators thru the SEC a written claim for payment of their separation pay and ECOLA, copy furnished to Atty. Zamuco, Chairman of the Board of Liquidators, and to the Ministry of Labor and Employment at Dagupan City. Atty. Zamuco directed the said claimants to submit supporting papers to the Chairman or Secretary of the Board of Liquidators so that their claims could be processed prompting the counsel of said claimants to move for the provisional dismissal of the NLRC case. 

On October 9, 1986, however, the private respondents revived their claims with the MOLE Dagupan Office when nothing positive was arrived at. They filed a formal complaint against PRI for payment of their separation pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA and damages. LA Rimando rendered the disputed decision. PRI appealed. NLRC affirmed the appealed Decision of the LA. 

LA Saludares, who replaced LA Rimando, called the parties to a conference but only the private respondents appeared. Fernandez (President of PRI) and Zabala (Board Chairman of NPRI) failed to appear on the two scheduled conferences. LA Olairez, who replaced LA Saludares, issued a Special Order for garnishment. NPRI filed a 3rd party claim on the levied/garnished properties but it was denied. 

In G.R. No. 86968

Shortly before the 3rd party claim was denied by LA Olairez, NPRI filed with RTC Dagupan City a complaint against the labor arbiter and the private respondents for injunction and damages with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Judge Sison of the RTC issued a TRO. Olairez filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied.

Aside from the Civil Case, Fernandez had filed a letter-complaint with the Ombudsman against petitioner Olairez, questioning the judgment award in the labor case. Olairez received a copy of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. (YES)

HELD: 

At the outset, We declare petitioner guilty of forum shopping when it filed, despite the pendency of G.R. 85939, Civil Case D9187 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition (G.R. 85939) and the action before the Regional Trial Court involve "the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances”:

In the action before the Regional Trial Court, as in the action before this Honorable Court, the validity and legality of the proceedings in NLRC Case No. SUB-RAB-I-071-86 and the propriety of implementing the decision therein against the petitioner were the basic issues. So, too, the relief was basically the same: the prevention of such implementation or execution. (p.130, Rollo, G.R. 85939)

In the case of Villanueva v. Adre (G.R. No. 80863, April 27, 1989, 172 SCRA 876), We stated:

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 85939, the NLRC decision is AFFIRMED and the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued in said case is hereby SET ASIDE.

In G.R. No. 86968, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED. Civil Case No. D-9187 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction of the said court.

Mr. Renato C. Zabala and Atty. Felipe P. de Vera, Sr., are required to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for having filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City and the Ombudsman on the same issue raised in this petition seeking the same prayer and relief. Atty. Felipe P. de Vera, Sr. is likewise directed to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law by reason of his having committed an act of forum shopping, both within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.

Double costs against private respondent New Pangasinan Review, Inc.

Department of Labor and Employment v. Kentex Manufacturing Corp.

Facts: A fire broke out in the factory located in Valenzuela City owned by Kentex. The fire claimed 72 lives and injured a number of workers. As part of its standard procedures, personnel of DOLE­ CAMANAVA Field Office went to Kentex's premises. For its part, the DOLE-NCR also assessed Kentex's compliance with the occupational health and safety standards. Tt was discovered that Kentex had contracted with CJC Manpower Services (CJC) for the deployment of workers. The DOLE-NCR directed Kentex and CJC to attend the mandatory conference. Notably, Kentex, its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Beato Ang, and the corporation's Chief Finance Officer Ong, were made parties to this case before the DOLE-NCR.

DOLE-NCR ruled against Kentex Manufacturing Corporation and/or Beato C. Ang and/or Ong King Guan. 

CA modified the ruling that Ong, as a company officer, he could not be personally held liable for the debts of Kentex without a showing of bad faith or wrongdoing on his part for the corporation's unlawful act.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in releasing Ong from monetary liability because a corporate officer has a juridical personality entirely separate and distinct from the corporation.

Held: Yes. CA committed serious error when it ordered the discharge or release of Ong from the obligations of Kentex. The reason is elemental in its simplicity: contrary to settled, unrelenting jurisprudence, it unconsciously and egregiously sought to alter and modify, as indeed it altered and modified, an already final and executory verdict.

Here, instead of filing an appeal with the DOLE Secretary, Ong moved for a reconsideration of the subject Order; needless to say, this did not halt or stop the running of the period to elevate the matter to the DOLE Secretary.

Salafranca v. Philamlife (Pamplona) Village Homeowners Association, Inc.

Doctrine: The right to amend the by-laws by the employer, extensive as it may be, cannot impair the obligation of existing contracts or rights. 

Facts: Petitioner Enrique Salafranca started working with the Philamlife Village Homeowners Association on May 1, 1981 as administrative officer for a period of six months. As administrative officer, petitioner was generally responsible for the management of the village’s day to day activities. After petitioner’s term of employment expired on December 31, 1983, he still continued to work in the same capacity, albeit, without the benefit of a renewed contract. 

Sometime in 1987, private respondent decided to amend its by- laws. Included therein was a provision regarding officers, specifically, the position of administrative officer under which said officer shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board of Directors. He informed the petitioner that his term of office shall be coterminus with the Board of Directors which appointed him to his position. Furthermore, until be submits a medical certificate showing his state of health, his employment shall be on a month-to-month basis. Oddly, notwithstanding the failure of herein petitioner to submit his medical certificate, he continued working until his termination in December 1992. 

He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner his backwages, separation pay and 13th month pay. 

On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision. NLRC viewed the dismissal of the petitioner as a valid act by the private respondent. 

Issues: Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the employment of the Petitioner is not purely based on considerations of Employer-Employee relationship and whether or not Petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondents. 

Held: Having reviewed the records of this case carefully, we conclude that private respondent utterly failed to substantiate petitioner’s dismissal, rendering the latter’s termination illegal. At the risk of being redundant, it must be stressed that these requirements are mandatory and non-compliance therewith renders any judgment reached by the management void and inexistent.

While private respondent imputes “gross negligence,” and “serious misconduct” as the causes of petitioner’s dismissal, not a shred of evidence was offered in support thereof, other than bare and uncorroborated allegations. The facts and circumstances regarding such alleged infractions were never explained. While it is true that private respondent, through its president Bonifacio Dazo, executed an affidavit narrating the alleged violations of the petitioner, these were never corroborated by concrete or competent evidence. It is settled that no undue importance should be given to a sworn statement or affidavit as a piece of evidence because, being taken ex-parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate. Furthermore, it must be noted that when petitioner was terminated in 1992, these alleged infractions were never raised nor communicated to him. In fact, these were only revealed after the complaint was filed by the petitioner in 1993. Why there was a delay was never adequately explained by private respondent. 

The essence of due process is to afford the party an opportunity to be heard and defend himself, to cleanse his name and reputation from any taint. It includes the twin requirements of notice and hearing. 

Furthermore, private respondent, in an effort to validate the dismissal of the petitioner, posits the theory that the latter’s position is coterminus with that of the Village’s Board of Directors, as provided for in its amended by-laws.

Admittedly, the right to amend the by-laws lies solely in the discretion of the employer, this being in the exercise of management prerogative or business judgment. However this right, extensive as it may be, cannot impair the obligation of existing contracts or rights. 

Prescinding from these premises, private respondent’s insistence that it can legally dismiss petitioner on the ground that his tenure has expired is untenable. To reiterate, petitioner, being a regular employee, is entitled to security of tenure; hence, his services may only be terminated for causes provided by law. A contrary interpretation would not find justification in the laws or the Constitution. If we were to rule otherwise, it would enable an employer to remove any employee from his employment by the simple expediency of amending its by-laws and providing that his/her position shall cease to exist upon the occurrence of a specified event.