Doctrine: The right to amend the by-laws by the employer, extensive as it may be, cannot impair the obligation of existing contracts or rights.
Facts: Petitioner Enrique Salafranca started working with the Philamlife Village Homeowners Association on May 1, 1981 as administrative officer for a period of six months. As administrative officer, petitioner was generally responsible for the management of the village’s day to day activities. After petitioner’s term of employment expired on December 31, 1983, he still continued to work in the same capacity, albeit, without the benefit of a renewed contract.
Sometime in 1987, private respondent decided to amend its by- laws. Included therein was a provision regarding officers, specifically, the position of administrative officer under which said officer shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board of Directors. He informed the petitioner that his term of office shall be coterminus with the Board of Directors which appointed him to his position. Furthermore, until be submits a medical certificate showing his state of health, his employment shall be on a month-to-month basis. Oddly, notwithstanding the failure of herein petitioner to submit his medical certificate, he continued working until his termination in December 1992.
He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner his backwages, separation pay and 13th month pay.
On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision. NLRC viewed the dismissal of the petitioner as a valid act by the private respondent.
Issues: Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the employment of the Petitioner is not purely based on considerations of Employer-Employee relationship and whether or not Petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondents.
Held: Having reviewed the records of this case carefully, we conclude that private respondent utterly failed to substantiate petitioner’s dismissal, rendering the latter’s termination illegal. At the risk of being redundant, it must be stressed that these requirements are mandatory and non-compliance therewith renders any judgment reached by the management void and inexistent.
While private respondent imputes “gross negligence,” and “serious misconduct” as the causes of petitioner’s dismissal, not a shred of evidence was offered in support thereof, other than bare and uncorroborated allegations. The facts and circumstances regarding such alleged infractions were never explained. While it is true that private respondent, through its president Bonifacio Dazo, executed an affidavit narrating the alleged violations of the petitioner, these were never corroborated by concrete or competent evidence. It is settled that no undue importance should be given to a sworn statement or affidavit as a piece of evidence because, being taken ex-parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate. Furthermore, it must be noted that when petitioner was terminated in 1992, these alleged infractions were never raised nor communicated to him. In fact, these were only revealed after the complaint was filed by the petitioner in 1993. Why there was a delay was never adequately explained by private respondent.
The essence of due process is to afford the party an opportunity to be heard and defend himself, to cleanse his name and reputation from any taint. It includes the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
Furthermore, private respondent, in an effort to validate the dismissal of the petitioner, posits the theory that the latter’s position is coterminus with that of the Village’s Board of Directors, as provided for in its amended by-laws.
Admittedly, the right to amend the by-laws lies solely in the discretion of the employer, this being in the exercise of management prerogative or business judgment. However this right, extensive as it may be, cannot impair the obligation of existing contracts or rights.
Prescinding from these premises, private respondent’s insistence that it can legally dismiss petitioner on the ground that his tenure has expired is untenable. To reiterate, petitioner, being a regular employee, is entitled to security of tenure; hence, his services may only be terminated for causes provided by law. A contrary interpretation would not find justification in the laws or the Constitution. If we were to rule otherwise, it would enable an employer to remove any employee from his employment by the simple expediency of amending its by-laws and providing that his/her position shall cease to exist upon the occurrence of a specified event.
No comments:
Post a Comment