Ang v. Gupana

FACTS: Ang filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Gupana. Ang alleged that he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo executed an Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition wherein he was given a share. However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out that the TCT had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs.

Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct participation in the commission of forgeries and falsifications because he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss and Deed of Absolute Sale that led to the transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Respondent denied any wrongdoing. Ang admitted that he is not an heir of the late Candelaria Magpayo but insisted on his claim for a share of the lot because he is allegedly the son of the late Isaias Ang, the common-law husband of Candelaria Magpayo. Because of his admission, the notice of lis pendens annotated in the four certificates of title of the land in question were ordered cancelled and the land effectively became available for disposition.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is administratively liable. YES

HELD: The Court finds that respondent did not act unethically when he sold the property in dispute as the sellers’ attorney-in-fact because there was no more notice of lis pendens annotated on the particular lot sold. Likewise, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to show that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Candelaria Magpayo was antedated.

However, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss. 

Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the CPR. Respondent averred that it had been his consistent practice to course through clerical staff documents to be notarized. Upon referral, said clerical staff investigates whether the documents are complete as to the fundamental requirements and inquires as to the identity of the individual signatories thereto. If everything is in order, they ask the parties to sign the documents and forward them to him and he again inquires about the identities of the parties before affixing his notarial signature. It is also his clerical staff who records entries in his notarial report.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, Atty. James Joseph Gupana is found administratively liable for misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. Further, his notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years, with a stem warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Angeles v. Bagay

FACTS: Atty. Angeles, Jr. ,the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, submitted a letter to Hon. Escalada, Jr. , Executive Judge of the RTC Bataan against Atty. Bagay, for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the country. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents cameout of the office already signed.

ISSUE: Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence. YES

HELD: Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. 

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the CPR. His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with MODIFICATION.1âwphi1 Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as notary public for a period of 2 years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for 3 months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

Tapay v. Bancolo

FACTS: Tapay and Rustia received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Divinagracia, a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo. The Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint and ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document and Dishonesty be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit by Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. The case was dismissed. The administrative case for dishonesty was also dismissed. 

Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder are guilty for the violating Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the CPR. YES for Atty. Bancolo and NO for Atty. Jarder

HELD: Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He  also stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the CPR by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

In re: Medado

FACTS: Medano graduated from UP in 1979 and passed the same year’s bar examinations. He took the Attorney’s Oath. He was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys when he went home to his province for a vacation. Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”; and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number. In 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether Medano’s Petition be denied for gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. NO

HELD: Petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the Petition. It was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law. Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.

However, the SC cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction. While it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, the SC found no liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him. While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys 1 YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio

FACTS: Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. 

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman. As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome. On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family with the statement "Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal activities and transactions.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. NO

HELD: The Court agrees with the findings of IBP with modifications. The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing evidence. With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof.

However, the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the CPR. In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 6 months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Aguirre v. Rana

FACTS: Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. 

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the MBEC of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading wherein the respondent represented himself as counsel and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Rana engaged in unauthorized practice of law. YES

HELD: The Court affirmed the findings of the OBC that respondent Rana engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and therefore he cannot be admitted in the Philippine Bar. While respondent passed the Bar Examinations, and later on was allowed by the Court to take the lawyer’s oath, it was emphasized by the Court that it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. The Court held that passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law, and that respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court held that, having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. 

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, the Court found that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. So while there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. NLRC; LA Olairez v. Judge Sison

DOCTRINES: There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.

FACTS:

In G.R. No. 85939

Private respondents were employees of Pangasinan Review, Inc. (PRI), a corporation engaged in the business of printing, bookbinding and publishing newspapers whose corporate life legally expired on October 27, 1982 after fifty years of corporate existence. However, it actually continued its business operations until it was advised by the SEC in a letter dated January 10, 1985. 

The Board of Directors minus Zamuco and Mrs. Fernandez who were then absent, acting as a Board of Liquidators of the company passed a resolution conveying corporate properties of the defunct PRI, to the NPRI which had been newly incorporated. 

The nineteen private respondents, among others, filed with the Chairman of the Board of Liquidators thru the SEC a written claim for payment of their separation pay and ECOLA, copy furnished to Atty. Zamuco, Chairman of the Board of Liquidators, and to the Ministry of Labor and Employment at Dagupan City. Atty. Zamuco directed the said claimants to submit supporting papers to the Chairman or Secretary of the Board of Liquidators so that their claims could be processed prompting the counsel of said claimants to move for the provisional dismissal of the NLRC case. 

On October 9, 1986, however, the private respondents revived their claims with the MOLE Dagupan Office when nothing positive was arrived at. They filed a formal complaint against PRI for payment of their separation pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA and damages. LA Rimando rendered the disputed decision. PRI appealed. NLRC affirmed the appealed Decision of the LA. 

LA Saludares, who replaced LA Rimando, called the parties to a conference but only the private respondents appeared. Fernandez (President of PRI) and Zabala (Board Chairman of NPRI) failed to appear on the two scheduled conferences. LA Olairez, who replaced LA Saludares, issued a Special Order for garnishment. NPRI filed a 3rd party claim on the levied/garnished properties but it was denied. 

In G.R. No. 86968

Shortly before the 3rd party claim was denied by LA Olairez, NPRI filed with RTC Dagupan City a complaint against the labor arbiter and the private respondents for injunction and damages with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Judge Sison of the RTC issued a TRO. Olairez filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied.

Aside from the Civil Case, Fernandez had filed a letter-complaint with the Ombudsman against petitioner Olairez, questioning the judgment award in the labor case. Olairez received a copy of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. (YES)

HELD: 

At the outset, We declare petitioner guilty of forum shopping when it filed, despite the pendency of G.R. 85939, Civil Case D9187 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition (G.R. 85939) and the action before the Regional Trial Court involve "the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances”:

In the action before the Regional Trial Court, as in the action before this Honorable Court, the validity and legality of the proceedings in NLRC Case No. SUB-RAB-I-071-86 and the propriety of implementing the decision therein against the petitioner were the basic issues. So, too, the relief was basically the same: the prevention of such implementation or execution. (p.130, Rollo, G.R. 85939)

In the case of Villanueva v. Adre (G.R. No. 80863, April 27, 1989, 172 SCRA 876), We stated:

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 85939, the NLRC decision is AFFIRMED and the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued in said case is hereby SET ASIDE.

In G.R. No. 86968, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED. Civil Case No. D-9187 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction of the said court.

Mr. Renato C. Zabala and Atty. Felipe P. de Vera, Sr., are required to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for having filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City and the Ombudsman on the same issue raised in this petition seeking the same prayer and relief. Atty. Felipe P. de Vera, Sr. is likewise directed to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law by reason of his having committed an act of forum shopping, both within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.

Double costs against private respondent New Pangasinan Review, Inc.

In re: Almacen

DOCTRINES: A lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, may criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the act of courts and judges. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. 

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. 

Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. 

FACTS:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court.” He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.” His client’s he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the cause of his client “in the people’s forum,” so that “the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court,” and that “whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated.” 

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Manila Times published the statements. It was quoted by columnist Vicente Pacis of the Manila Chronicle. Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had “accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself,” and that “his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment.” 

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. He moved for reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For ‘lack of proof of service,” the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court. The trial court elevated the case to the CA but it was dismissed. The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Atty. Almacen appealed to the SC but it was also denied.

Hence, the Petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Atty. Almacen should be disciplined. (YES)

HELD: 

Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members, as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almaeen’s petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and •texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer’s oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable. 

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. 

In re: Argonsino

DOCTRINE: The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed. 

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.

FACTS:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the RTC QC, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with 13 other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan, which stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. Each of the 14 accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years.

Mr. Argonsino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted, which was set at 2 years, counted from the probationer’s initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. 

Less than a month later, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations and passed. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of office.

Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period. We note that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed 3 Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Argonsino should be allowed to take the attorney’s oath and to admit him to the practice of law. (No ruling; Argonsino was asked to submit evidence)

HELD:

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people’s confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.

Mr. Argosino’s participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at-the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney’s oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Catbagan v. Barte

Facts:

This is the case of Judge Barte for grave and serious misconduct. Complainant was interested in buying land in Antique. She approached respondent judge and requested him to assist her in the prospective transaction. Together with Pedriña, the three of them agreed to divide the commission if they succeeded in brokering the sale of properties to the Church. When complainant heard that the vendors had been paid, she demanded her commission from respondent. However, respondent offered her only P25,000 for the two transactions, excluding the one in Hamtic.

The respondent denied the charges against him and asked for the dismissal of the administrative case on the grounds that “first, there was ambiguity in the charge of grave and serious misconduct in the complaint and conduct unbecoming of a judge in the OCA endorsement. Because of this confusion, he was deprived of his right to be informed of the real charge against him. Consequently, he was not able to properly prepare his defense” ; and “second, complainant's allegations were baseless and designed merely to harass and dishonor respondent.”

OCA found respondent not guilty of the charges against him but recommended a fine of P5,000 for violating Canon 5, Rule 5.02 13 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It also warned respondent against directly engaging in any private business even outside office hours, otherwise a more severe penalty would be imposed upon him.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Barte is liable for the violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Held:
Respondent judge ought perhaps to seriously consider leaving the judiciary and becoming a full-time real estate broker instead. The latter calling appears to have a special appeal to him. He was reminded that judges must not only be "good judges" but must also "appear to be good persons." In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue; it is a necessity.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte is hereby found guilty of violating Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering that this is his second offense, he is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months. He is hereby warned that another complaint of this kind will merit a penalty beyond mere suspension from public office.