Mistica v. Republic

Facts:

Petitioner filed with the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an Application for Registration of Title over a parcel of land known as Lot 7766-D located in Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Attached to the application were the following documents: 1) the technical description of the subject lot; 2) Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate; 3) tax declaration of Real Property No. 06075, covering the subject lot effective 1998; 4) official receipts of realty tax payments; and 5) blueprint/machine copies of Subdivision Plan Csd-03-010587-D. Petitioner prayed for the registration and confirmation of her title over the subject lot.

However, according to the Director of Lands, a) neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; b) the muniments of title did not appear to be genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for, or of petitioners open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945; c) the claim of ownership in fee simple of the subject lot on the basis of a Spanish title or grant could no longer be availed of by petitioner who failed to file an appropriate application for registration within a period of six (6) months from January 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; and d) the subject lot applied for was a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

During trial, petitioner testified that the previous owner and possessor of the subject lot was her father. In support thereof, she presented a photocopy of a document dated May 16, 1921, written in Spanish, which allegedly was the Deed of Sale of the subject lot, with his father as the vendee. After the death of her father, the heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of his estate. Eventually, she acquired sole ownership over the subject property.

MTC found that the subject property was alienable and disposable, and that petitioner sufficiently established her right over the lot in question and granted petitioners application for registration.

A Motion for Reconsideration was denied, thus respondents filed a Notice of Appeal to the RTC. RTC held that it had no jurisdiction over the case and instead forwarded the case to the CA considering that the appeal had already been perfected when the MTC gave due course to petitioners notice of appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner failed to prove that she has been [in] open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Held:

Petition denied. In accordance with Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073, any person, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, may file in the proper trial court an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through his duly authorized representative.

Being the applicant for confirmation of imperfect title, petitioner bears the burden of proving that: 1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and 2) she has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. These the petitioner must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.

Petitioner presented documentary evidence such as the technical description of the subject lot, Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate, tax declaration of real property, official receipts of realty tax payments, blueprint/machine copies of Subdivision Plan Csd-03-010587-D, joint affidavits of her co-heirs, and Deed of Partition dated July 30, 1980. Moreover, petitioner presented a document written in Spanish which she claimed to be a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 16, 1921. Lastly, she testified that she acquired the subject lot from her parents who had been the owners and possessors thereof since she was still very young.

These pieces of evidence, taken together, do not suffice to prove that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The technical description, Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate, and blueprint copies of the subdivision plan only prove the identity of the lot sought to be registered. The joint affidavits of her co-heirs, as well as the Deed of Partition, merely show that petitioner acquired the property through succession.

The Court notes, however, that the tax declaration was effective only in 1998, and that the tax receipts were dated 1997 and 1998. She failed to adduce in evidence any tax declaration over the property under the name of her parents and that the realty taxes for the property had been paid prior to 1998. At best, she offered a copy of a tax declaration which began in 1985 in the name of her co-heirs. While a tax declaration by itself is not adequate to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of real property for taxation purposes not only manifests ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse claim against the state and all other interested parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

The presentation of a document dated May 16, 1921 which, according to petitioner, was a Deed of Sale of the subject property where her father was the vendee, did not work to her advantage. In the first place, the document was written in Spanish and petitioner did not bother to have the contents thereof translated to English or to any other language that the court could understand.

Petitioner failed to state the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership of the land applied for. To be sure, general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.

Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.