PNR v. CA

Facts:

Winifredo Tupang boarded 'Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death.The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the information. Police authorities of Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang.

Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-respiratory failure due to massive cerebral hemorrhage due to traumatic injury.

Rosario Tupang, the deceased’s widow, filed a complaint to CFI Rizal. The Court held the petitioner PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage and ordered "to pay the plaintiff the sum of P12,000,00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity and the further sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.

CA sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the utmost diligence required by law of a common carrier. It further increased the amount adjudicated by the trial court by ordering PNR to pay the plaintiff an additional sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

PNR filed an MR. PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit. It alleged that it is a mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of its own, and that its funds are governmental in character and, therefore, not subject to garnishment or execution. The motion was denied; the respondent court ruled that the ground advanced could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Issue: 

Whether or not PNR is liable for the death of Winifredo Tupang

Held: 

No. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as amended. Section 4 of the said Act provides:

The Philippine National Railways shall have the following powers:

a. To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and

b. Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law.

Under the foregoing section, the PNR has all the powers, the characteristics and attributes of a corporation under the Corporation Law. There can be no question then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.

Justice Fernando cited the Court's holding in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, to wit: "The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government- owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has-pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 * * *, pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established- 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law * * *.

The case of Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Co., laid down the rule that "when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. [Bank of the U.S. v. Planters' Bank, 9 Waitch 904, 6 L. ed. 244]. By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations. 

The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge. 

The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.

But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be set aside. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. There being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner, the grant of exemplary damages should be discarded.

People v. Castillo, Jr.

Facts:

Domingo Castillo, Jr. (Boyet) and his father Domingo Castillo, Sr. (Domingo) were in the D&G Restaurant in Norzagaray, Bulacan, drinking beer. After 2 hours of drinking, a group of noisy customers arrived. Domingo knew about his son’s propensity to get into fights so he asked Boyet to go home with him. Boyet drove to the direction of their home in Angat, Bulacan. An argument ensued between the Boyet and his father who were both a bit drunk already because the former kept insisting that he should or could go back to the restaurant while the latter prevented him from doing so. Boyet abrupty stopped the pick up upon nearing their house and the victim alighted therefrom. Holding a bottle of beer in his right hand, the victim raised both of his hands, stood in front of the pick-up and said, sige kung gusto mo sagasaan mo ako, hindi ka makakaalis (go ahead, run over me if you want to leave). Boyet slowly drove the pick-up forward threatening to run over the victim. His father exclaimed, papatayin mo ba ako? (are you going to kill me?). Boyet backed-up almost hitting an owner type jeep parked at the side of the road and on board which were 4 people conversing with each other, including prosecution eyewitness, Ma. Cecilia Mariano. Then at high speed, Boyet drove the pick-up forward hitting the victim in the process. Not satisfied with what he had done, the appellant put the vehicle in reverse thereby running over the victim a second time. The appellant then alighted from the vehicle and walked towards their house.

Arthur Agaran saw the incident and brought the victim to Dolorosa Hospital at Norzagaray where he died.

Boyet passed off the death of his father as an accident. A suspicion of foul play surfaced when his sister from the US, Leslie C. Padilla, was given different versions of his death. the NBI made a formal investigation into the matter. She filed an information alleging parricide against her brother.

RTC found Boyet guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The prosecution has successfully established the elements of parricide: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

The records are bereft of any evidence that the appellant had tried to avoid hitting the victim who positioned himself in front of the pick-up. On the contrary, Marianos testimony is to the effect that prior to actually hitting the victim, the appellant was intimidating him by moving the pick-up forward, thus prompting the victim to exclaim, papatayin mo ba ako?. Worse, the appellant backed-up to gain momentum, then accelerated at a very fast speed knowing fully well that the vehicle would definitely hit the victim who was still standing in front of the same.

A man who had not intended to harm his own father would not walk but more likely run in search of help. Aware of the fact that his fathers life is precariously hanging in the balance, the normal reaction of a child is to waste no time in trying to save his life. The appellant, on the other hand, did not even lift a finger to help his own father whose life he had so brutally taken away. It was Agaran and the other workers who, on their own accord, brought the victim to the hospital. In the light of the foregoing circumstances, we therefore find it difficult to believe that the appellant did not act with malice. Worth reiterating here is the rule that evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself- such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.

Ironically, it is the appellant’s testimony that finally clinches his conviction. His testimony reveals that a certain degree of enmity and resentment characterized his relationship with his parents. The appellant was the only son of well to do parents. He had never held a days job in his entire life, and although already a family man himself, he continued to rely solely on his parents support. That he was a little spoiled is beyond doubt. The appellant admitted that during the previous years, he and his parents had some differences. As a matter of fact, several days prior to the incident, his father who wanted him to look for a job had a heart to heart talk with him, and asked him, ganito ka na lang ba? (will you never change?). Finally, it was the appellant himself who told the court that the incident was preceded by an argument between him and his father who was determined to prevent him from returning to the restaurant. But what exactly motivated the appellant to commit so heinous a crime continues to be beyond the comprehension of this court. 

No award of actual damages. The appellant should be made to pay the other heirs of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Before 1986, the Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman Jose de Venecia, Jr., was able to obtain foreign loans syndicated by various banks aggregating approximately $120 M. These foreign loans were guaranteed by PHILGUARANTEE, whose Board of Directors was then composed of private respondents, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin, and Cezar Zalamea. Congressman de Venecia's group of companies was unable to seasonably service these foreign loans and this compelled PHILGUARANTEE to assume its obligation as guarantor.

When President Cory Aquino became president, she created PCGG. It was given the difficult task of recovering the illegal wealth of the Marcoses, their family, subordinates and close associates. In due time, the Marcoses and their cronies had to face a flurry of cases, both civil and criminal, all designed to recover the Republic's wealth allegedly plundered by them while in power. Case No. 0020 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages was one of these cases. It was filed by the petitioner Republic against Jose de Venecia, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar C. Zalamea.

The de Venecia group of companies and PHILGUARANTEE were sequestered by the petitioner, through the PCGG.

de Venecia, Jr., moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 0020 against him. The  respondent court granted the motion to dismiss. The dismissal became final and executory. The other private respondents followed suit with their respective motions to dismiss. The motions were opposed by the petitioner. The respondent court dismissed the Expanded Complaint against herein private respondents. The dismissal was based on two (2) grounds: (1) removal of an indispensable party in the person of de Venecia, Jr., from the Expanded Complaint; and (2) lack of cause of action in view of the facts established and admitted by the petitioner in the Deed of Assignment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and its Supplement were denied by the respondent court.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the case against defendant de Venecia's co-defendants, on the following grounds:  a) The Deed of Assignment executed on July 19, 1989 by Landoil in favor of the petitioner should not be made to benefit de Venecia's co-defendant;  b) Defendant de Venecia is not an indispensable party in the prosecution of the case against his co-defendants; c) The liabilities of de Venecia's co-defendants arose not only from their alleged conspiracy with defendant de Venecia but also by virtue of their individual or collective actions done in unlawful concert with one another; d) The causes of action against defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos have nothing to do with the Deed of Assignment executed by Landoil in favor of the petitioner; and e) The parties manifestly intended to exclude defendant de Venecia's co-defendants from the benefit of the Deed of Assignment in question.

Held:

The specific allegations of the acts and omissions committed by respondents Bondoc and company and constitutive of petitioner's cause of action are recited in par. 11 of the Expanded Complaint. It is for this reason that par. 11 bears the descriptive title "Specific Averments of Defendants' Illegal Acts." Needless to stress, the cause of action of the petitioner against the said respondents is spelled out in par. 11 (a) to (f). A perusal of par. 11 will yield no other conclusion than that there is but one cause of action against these respondents -- that with conspiracy, they allegedly extended unwarranted guarantees to enable the de Venecia group of companies, all cronies of the Marcoses, to obtain foreign loans. The use of the phrase "among others" in the Expanded Complaint does not in any manner mean that petitioner has other concealed causes of action against these respondents. Smart pleaders resort to said artful phrase only to gain more leeway in presenting their evidence. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can it be maintained that the opaque phrase "among others" can confer a cause of action. Such a ruling cannot be reconciled with substantive due process which bars roaming generalities in any kind of complaint, whether civil or criminal. It is for this reason that section 1 of rule 8 of the Rules of Court requires that "every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be . . ." A transgression of this rule is fatal. Upon the other hand, paragraphs 13 to 17 of the Expanded Complaint contain mere general averments and do not allege petitioner's specific cause of action against these respondents. They speak for themselves and they need not undergo the scalpel of judicial scrutiny.

The Court need not agonize in search for the subjective intent of the petitioner in concluding the Deed of Assignment only with the seven (7) corporations of the de Venecia group of companies. Speculations on intent can be endless for it is the nature of unmanifested intent to be fugitive. What is determinative is that in the Deed of Assignment, petitioner itself admitted that it has no cause of action against these respondents in Civil Case No. 0020. The admission was made when, after conducting its own investigation, it found out that (1) de Venecia, Jr., was not a crony but a victim of the Marcoses; (2) the guarantees extended by the private respondents as members of the Board of Director of PHILGUARANTEE were given in "the ordinary and regular course of business and that no favor was accorded to the Landoil officers in the grant of such guarantee facility," and (3) that the business reversals experienced by the Landoil Group in connection with its various construction and other projects in the Middle East and elsewhere were due, firstly, to the inability of the Landoil Group to collect its contract receivables from such projects due to the reasons specified in the sixth "whereas" clause, and, secondly, due to the non-payment of its insurance claim. In light of these specific admissions, there is no need to speculate why the other corporations of de Venecia were not made parties to the Deed of Assignment.

There cannot be any iota of doubt that said respondents were sued as members of the Board of PHILGUARANTEE and not as public officials. Indeed, if they were able to guaranty the foreign loans of petitioner it was because they were members of the Board of PHILGUARANTEE and for no other reason. But even granting arguendo that these respondents were sued as public officials, we cannot perceive how they could be charged with betrayal of their trust considering again petitioner's admission that the guarantee facilities were extended in the "ordinary and regular course of business."

Petitioner was convinced that de Venecia, Jr., and company did not commit any actionable wrong, including any tortious act. It ought to follow that the complaint against the respondents Bondoc and company for extending the said guarantees in favor of de Venecia, Jr., cannot also be pursued any further. The complaint against de Venecia, Jr., and these respondents are inseparable, especially because petitioner relied on the theory of conspiracy. In any event, the rule with respect to the effect of release of one tortfeasor on other tortfeasors is still in a state of fluctuation even in the United States. Thus, the 2nd Restatement of the Law on Torts states:

Statutes.     About half of the states have now passed statutes covering the matter. They change the early common law with varying positions, but a substantial number provide that neither a release nor a covenant not to sue discharges the other tortfeasor unless its terms so provide. This is the provision in both the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.

Present status. States may now be classed as follows:

(1) A release amounts to a complete discharge, no matter what language is used.

(2)  An instrument in the form of a release discharges all tortfeasors; a covenant not to sue does not.

(3)  The intent is controlling, irrespective of the language — sometimes with a rebuttable presumption either for or against discharge of the other tortfeasor.

(4)  A release of one tortfeasor does not discharge the other unless it so provides. There is frequent change in the alignment of the states, usually in the direction toward classification.

The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company is compelled by the equal protection clause of the Constitution. De Venecia, Jr., and the respondents Bondoc and company are similarly situated. Respondent Bondoc, et al. were included in the Complaint only because they allegedly gave unwarranted favors to de Venecia, Jr., in guaranteeing the latter's foreign loans. When petitioner admitted that no undue favor was granted to de Venecia, Jr. in the grant of such guaranty facilities and dismissed its complaint against him, petitioner cannot avoid its duty of dismissing its complaint against respondents Bondoc and company. To give a more favored treatment to de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to indulge in invidious discrimination.