Republic v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Before 1986, the Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman Jose de Venecia, Jr., was able to obtain foreign loans syndicated by various banks aggregating approximately $120 M. These foreign loans were guaranteed by PHILGUARANTEE, whose Board of Directors was then composed of private respondents, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin, and Cezar Zalamea. Congressman de Venecia's group of companies was unable to seasonably service these foreign loans and this compelled PHILGUARANTEE to assume its obligation as guarantor.

When President Cory Aquino became president, she created PCGG. It was given the difficult task of recovering the illegal wealth of the Marcoses, their family, subordinates and close associates. In due time, the Marcoses and their cronies had to face a flurry of cases, both civil and criminal, all designed to recover the Republic's wealth allegedly plundered by them while in power. Case No. 0020 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages was one of these cases. It was filed by the petitioner Republic against Jose de Venecia, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar C. Zalamea.

The de Venecia group of companies and PHILGUARANTEE were sequestered by the petitioner, through the PCGG.

de Venecia, Jr., moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 0020 against him. The  respondent court granted the motion to dismiss. The dismissal became final and executory. The other private respondents followed suit with their respective motions to dismiss. The motions were opposed by the petitioner. The respondent court dismissed the Expanded Complaint against herein private respondents. The dismissal was based on two (2) grounds: (1) removal of an indispensable party in the person of de Venecia, Jr., from the Expanded Complaint; and (2) lack of cause of action in view of the facts established and admitted by the petitioner in the Deed of Assignment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and its Supplement were denied by the respondent court.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the case against defendant de Venecia's co-defendants, on the following grounds:  a) The Deed of Assignment executed on July 19, 1989 by Landoil in favor of the petitioner should not be made to benefit de Venecia's co-defendant;  b) Defendant de Venecia is not an indispensable party in the prosecution of the case against his co-defendants; c) The liabilities of de Venecia's co-defendants arose not only from their alleged conspiracy with defendant de Venecia but also by virtue of their individual or collective actions done in unlawful concert with one another; d) The causes of action against defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos have nothing to do with the Deed of Assignment executed by Landoil in favor of the petitioner; and e) The parties manifestly intended to exclude defendant de Venecia's co-defendants from the benefit of the Deed of Assignment in question.

Held:

The specific allegations of the acts and omissions committed by respondents Bondoc and company and constitutive of petitioner's cause of action are recited in par. 11 of the Expanded Complaint. It is for this reason that par. 11 bears the descriptive title "Specific Averments of Defendants' Illegal Acts." Needless to stress, the cause of action of the petitioner against the said respondents is spelled out in par. 11 (a) to (f). A perusal of par. 11 will yield no other conclusion than that there is but one cause of action against these respondents -- that with conspiracy, they allegedly extended unwarranted guarantees to enable the de Venecia group of companies, all cronies of the Marcoses, to obtain foreign loans. The use of the phrase "among others" in the Expanded Complaint does not in any manner mean that petitioner has other concealed causes of action against these respondents. Smart pleaders resort to said artful phrase only to gain more leeway in presenting their evidence. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can it be maintained that the opaque phrase "among others" can confer a cause of action. Such a ruling cannot be reconciled with substantive due process which bars roaming generalities in any kind of complaint, whether civil or criminal. It is for this reason that section 1 of rule 8 of the Rules of Court requires that "every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be . . ." A transgression of this rule is fatal. Upon the other hand, paragraphs 13 to 17 of the Expanded Complaint contain mere general averments and do not allege petitioner's specific cause of action against these respondents. They speak for themselves and they need not undergo the scalpel of judicial scrutiny.

The Court need not agonize in search for the subjective intent of the petitioner in concluding the Deed of Assignment only with the seven (7) corporations of the de Venecia group of companies. Speculations on intent can be endless for it is the nature of unmanifested intent to be fugitive. What is determinative is that in the Deed of Assignment, petitioner itself admitted that it has no cause of action against these respondents in Civil Case No. 0020. The admission was made when, after conducting its own investigation, it found out that (1) de Venecia, Jr., was not a crony but a victim of the Marcoses; (2) the guarantees extended by the private respondents as members of the Board of Director of PHILGUARANTEE were given in "the ordinary and regular course of business and that no favor was accorded to the Landoil officers in the grant of such guarantee facility," and (3) that the business reversals experienced by the Landoil Group in connection with its various construction and other projects in the Middle East and elsewhere were due, firstly, to the inability of the Landoil Group to collect its contract receivables from such projects due to the reasons specified in the sixth "whereas" clause, and, secondly, due to the non-payment of its insurance claim. In light of these specific admissions, there is no need to speculate why the other corporations of de Venecia were not made parties to the Deed of Assignment.

There cannot be any iota of doubt that said respondents were sued as members of the Board of PHILGUARANTEE and not as public officials. Indeed, if they were able to guaranty the foreign loans of petitioner it was because they were members of the Board of PHILGUARANTEE and for no other reason. But even granting arguendo that these respondents were sued as public officials, we cannot perceive how they could be charged with betrayal of their trust considering again petitioner's admission that the guarantee facilities were extended in the "ordinary and regular course of business."

Petitioner was convinced that de Venecia, Jr., and company did not commit any actionable wrong, including any tortious act. It ought to follow that the complaint against the respondents Bondoc and company for extending the said guarantees in favor of de Venecia, Jr., cannot also be pursued any further. The complaint against de Venecia, Jr., and these respondents are inseparable, especially because petitioner relied on the theory of conspiracy. In any event, the rule with respect to the effect of release of one tortfeasor on other tortfeasors is still in a state of fluctuation even in the United States. Thus, the 2nd Restatement of the Law on Torts states:

Statutes.     About half of the states have now passed statutes covering the matter. They change the early common law with varying positions, but a substantial number provide that neither a release nor a covenant not to sue discharges the other tortfeasor unless its terms so provide. This is the provision in both the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.

Present status. States may now be classed as follows:

(1) A release amounts to a complete discharge, no matter what language is used.

(2)  An instrument in the form of a release discharges all tortfeasors; a covenant not to sue does not.

(3)  The intent is controlling, irrespective of the language — sometimes with a rebuttable presumption either for or against discharge of the other tortfeasor.

(4)  A release of one tortfeasor does not discharge the other unless it so provides. There is frequent change in the alignment of the states, usually in the direction toward classification.

The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company is compelled by the equal protection clause of the Constitution. De Venecia, Jr., and the respondents Bondoc and company are similarly situated. Respondent Bondoc, et al. were included in the Complaint only because they allegedly gave unwarranted favors to de Venecia, Jr., in guaranteeing the latter's foreign loans. When petitioner admitted that no undue favor was granted to de Venecia, Jr. in the grant of such guaranty facilities and dismissed its complaint against him, petitioner cannot avoid its duty of dismissing its complaint against respondents Bondoc and company. To give a more favored treatment to de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to indulge in invidious discrimination.