Palafox v. Wangdali

 Doctrine: The Court is not a trier of facts. As a rule, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are completely devoid of support from the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a gross misapprehension of facts.

Exceptions: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the. issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When die findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

Facts: Palafox had in his name a Certificate of Time Deposit issued by the respondent bank with maturity date on April 12, 2003. On June 11, 2003, Palafox went to the Bank to surrender the CTD and claim its value in the amount of P1,181,388.99. However, the Bank's employees refused to give him the value of the CTD and advised him to wait for the Bank Manager, Wangdali. She likewise refused to give him the CTD's value.

On June 12, 2003, Atty. Orro, counsel for Palafox, wrote a letter dated June 12, 2003 addressed to Wangdali demanding payment of the value of the CTD. In her reply, Wangdali related that the Bank could not yet act on Palafox' request as it was under investigation by the BSP on the ground that Palafox might have been a party in defrauding and misappropriation of the Bank's funds.

Hence, the Complaint for Withdrawal of Deposit and Damages filed by a certain Orodio on behalf of Palafox praying for the payment of the CTD's value with accrued interests. Orodio was equipped, with SPA executed by Palafox authorizing him to institute the instant complaint.

The Bank and Wangdali filed a Motion to Dismiss and argued that the complaint did not state a cause of action and Palafox' noncompliance with the rule on filing a certificate of non-forum shopping as this was executed by Orodio and not by the principal party to the case who had the knowledge of whether or not he had initiated similar actions or proceedings in different agencies.

RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga denied the motion to dismiss. The RTC ordered the parties to submit a position prayed regarding the preliminary attachment prayed for by Palafox.

Petitioner Palafox did not file a position paper. Thus, invoking Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, the respondents filed another motion to dismiss. The RTC granted the respondents' prayer to retain the deposit, but denied the motion to dismiss as it saw the need to proceed with the trial of the case.

The respondents then filed an Answer with Counterclaim reiterating, among others, that the complaint did not have a cause of action because Palafox was a nominal depositor who did not actually own the deposit; that the CTD was a renewal certificate and the history of the deposit revealed that the CTD originated from two deposit accounts, to wit: (1) the first account was opened by a certain Rachel Orodio, the former general manager of the Bank, and renewed under the name "N. Palafox by Rachel B. Orodio"; and (2) the second account was opened in the name of Noli Palafox; that the money used to open the account was the proceeds of a simulated loan which Rachel Orodio granted to petitioner Palafox; that Rachel Orodio only used Palafox as a dummy and used the latter's name to appear in the CTD, a violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act; and for that reason, the matter was reported to the Anti-Money Laundering Council.

While the case was pending before the RTC, the respondents filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the RTC's Resolution that denied their second motion to dismiss. However, the CA denied the petition. The respondents sought for the Court's review. The Court denied it.

RTC issued the Decision granting the relief prayed for by Palafox for failure of the respondents to rebut Palafox's allegations and documentary evidence. CA reversed the findings of the RTC. Petitioner Filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the CA denied it. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: The CA committed serious errors or law and jurisprudence in allowing a change of theory by the private respondents on appeal.

Held: The petition is denied. The Court is not a trier of facts. As a rule, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are completely devoid of support from the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a gross misapprehension of facts.

Like all other general rules, this also admits of exceptions which have already expanded over time. As enumerated in Pascual v. Burgos, et al., there arc 10 recognized exceptions laid down in Medina v. Mayor. Asistio, Jr., which are as follows:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the. issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When die findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

However, none of the above-mentioned exceptions exists in this case. Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the appellate court, more So, when these are supported by substantial evidence.

A judicious perusal of the petition shows that Palafox raises issues which are a mere rehash of what were already raised before the appellate court. Whether or nor Palafox is the person "Noli Palafox" named in the CTD, and whether or not there was a change of theory by the respondents on appeal, are clearly questions of facts which have all been settled by the appellate court.

Even when the Court is to consider the facts as alleged by Palafox, the Court will reach to the same conclusion that he failed to prove his claims against the respondents. Palafox failed to establish his case by preponderance of evidence.

MISNET, INC., v. CIR

 Doctrine: For a party to seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant the Court's suspension of the rules. Indeed, the Court is confronted with the need to balance stringent application of technical rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial significance to relax said rules based on equity and justice.

Facts: Petitioner received a PAN. Petitioner then filed a letter-protest on the PAN. Petitioner received a FAN. Petitioner paid for certain undisputed assessments. On the same day, petitioner administratively protested the FAN by filing a request for reconsideration. The CIR acknowledged receipt of the payment and the protest letter and informed the petitioner that its tax docket had been forwarded to RDO North Makati. Petitioner sent a letter to Revenue Officer Paralejas reiterating its protest to the PAN and the FAN. CIR again wrote a letter to petitioner informing it that it found additional deficiency taxes due. Petitioner received an Amended Assessment Notice reflecting an amended deficiency EWT after reinvestigation. On the same date, petitioner received an FDDA stating that after reinvestigation, there was still due from petitioner. This FDDA was received by petitioner on March 28, 2011. 

On April 8, 2011, petitioner filed a letter-reply to the Amended Assessment Notice and FDDA, which was received by the CIR on April 11, 2011. On May 9, 2011, the CIR sent a letter to petitioner which states in part that petitioner's letter-reply dated April 8, 2011 produced no legal effect since it availed of the improper remedy. It should have appealed the final decision of the CIR to the CTA within thirty days from the date of receipt of the said Decision, otherwise, the assessment became final, executory and demandable. On May 27, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with respondent Commissioner arguing that it was not able to file its proper appeal of the FDDA due to its mistake and excusable negligence as it was not assisted by counsel. On June 29, 2011, petitioner received a Preliminary Collection Letter dated June 22, 2011, which is deemed a denial of petitioner's Petition for Relief.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. Meanwhile, the CIR filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was granted. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc but it was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the CTA gravely erred in dismissing the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: For a party to seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant the Court's suspension of the rules. Indeed, the Court is confronted with the need to balance stringent application of technical rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial significance to relax said rules based on equity and justice. 

Petitioner's belated filing of an appeal with the CTA is not without strong, compelling reason. We could say that petitioner was merely exhausting all administrative remedies available before seeking recourse to the judicial courts. While the rule is that a taxpayer has 30 days to appeal to the CTA from the final decision of the CIR, the said rule could not be applied if the Assessment Notice itself clearly states that the taxpayer must file a protest with the CIR or the Regional Director within 30 days from receipt of the Assessment Notice. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we opted not to apply the statutory period within which to appeal with the CTA considering that no final decision yet was issued by the CIR on petitioner's protest. The subsequent appeal taken by petitioner is from the inaction of the CIR on its protest.

Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Union Bank of the Philippines

 Doctrine: For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites or elements must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

Facts: EYCO and its controlling stockholders, the Yutingcos filed with the SEC a "Petition for the Declaration of Suspension of Payment[s], Formation and Appointment of Rehabilitation Receiver/Committee, Approval of Rehabilitation Plan with Alternative Prayer for Liquidation and Dissolution of Corporations”. A consortium of EYCO's creditors composed of 22 domestic banks, including Union Bank, convened for the purpose of deciding their options in the event that EYCO and its co-petitioners would invoke the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A, as amended.

However, Union Bank, without notifying the members of the Consortium, decided to break away from the group by suing EYCO and the Yutingcos in the regular courts. Union Bank alleged that Spouses Yutingco were its debtors by virtue of a Continuing Surety Agreement to secure credit accommodations granted to NIKON, which they owned. Upon investigation, Union Bank confirmed that majority of NIKON's assets were used to purchase real estate properties through EYCO, purposely to shield NIKON from answering for its debts. EYCO owned condominium units and parking spaces in Tektite Tower and the Strata 200 Building Condominium Project. These properties were sold to herein petitioner, FEBTC. Union Bank claimed that the sale of the properties was fraudulent and done in bad faith to prevent them from being levied upon; in fact, it was made a day before the Spouses Yutingco and NIKON filed a petition for suspension of payments with the SEC.

An Order was issued by the SEC enjoining the disposition of the debtor corporations' properties in any manner except in the ordinary course of business and payment outside of legitimate business expenses during the pendency of the proceedings and suspending all actions, claims and proceedings against EYCO until further orders from the SEC. The SEC Hearing Panel directed the creation of a Management Committee.

Union Bank filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the Order declaring the suspension of payments for EYCO and directing the creation of the MANCOM. Union Bank contended that these issuances were premature and would render the motion to dismiss filed before the RTC as moot.

SC held that the SEC's jurisdiction on matters of suspension of payments is confined only to those initiated by corporations, partnerships or associations. Consequently, the SEC exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the Spouses Yutingco together with EYCO under suspension of payments.

SEC issued an Order adopting the Unsolicited Rehabilitation Proposal submitted by Strategies and Alliances Corporation (SAC) which was granted a period of six months within which to complete the groundwork for the effective implementation of the early "all-debt payment plan.” The SEC Order further barred all creditors from pursuing their respective claims until further orders.

The Consortium appealed the Order to the SEC En Banc. The SEC En Banc rendered its Decision finding the SAC plan not viable and feasible for the rehabilitation of EYCO. SEC issued an Order directing all creditors claiming against EYCO to file their formal claims with the Liquidator.

The Spouses Yutingco filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of pendency of the proceedings in the SEC which had acquired prior jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. FEBTC also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of Union Bank's failure to implead NIKON, which are indispensable parties. The RTC granted the motions to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia.

Union Bank filed an appeal with the CA. CA granted Union Bank's appeal and reversed the assailed orders of the RTC. BAYAN filed a Motion for Substitution With Motion to Admit Comment. XA granted the motion for substitution.

Issues: Whether or not the civil case should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia; whether or not Union Bank was guilty of forum shopping; and whether or not Union Bank had the legal personality to file the civil case.

Held: Petition is denied. Litis pendentia is not applicable to the present case. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites or elements must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. None of the requisites were present in this case.

There being no litis pendentia or res judicata, we find Union Bank not guilty of forum shopping. Jurisprudence has laid down the test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.

Cabrera v. PSA

Doctrine: Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence, may be waived.

Facts: Petitioner alleged that she was born on July 20, 1989 at Zuba Estate, Lahad Datu Sabah, Malaysia. However, due to the distance between their house and the Philippine Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, it was only on August 27, 2008 that her mother reported her birth. NSO in Manila, not PSA, received her first Report of Birth. Subsequently, petitioner discovered that her date of birth was wrongfully entered as July 20, 1980. However, instead of correcting the said error with the Philippine Embassy, petitioner's mother registered her birth for the second time. 

Because she had two Reports of Birth, petitioner encountered difficulties in securing official documents, prompting her to file a petition for cancellation of her first Report of Birth before RTC Davao City. RTC granted the petition. OSG filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. 

OSG appealed to the CA which was granted upon a finding that since petitioner's birth was already validly registered, it can no longer be the subject of a second registration. The proper recourse would have been to file a petition for correction of entry to correct her first Report of Birth under Rule 108.

Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration therefrom, petitioner re filed the present petition to: (a) correct her year of birth from July 20, 1980 to July 20, 1989 in her first Report of Birth; and (b) cancel her second Report of Birth under Rule 108. The RTC dismissed the petition. The petition should have been filed with the RTC where petitioner's first Record of Birth was registered, i.e., the RTC of the place where the PSA is located, which is Quezon City, and not the RTC of petitioner's residence in Davao City.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the re-filed petition on the ground of improper venue.

Held: Yes. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence, may be waived. Venue is the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought. In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.

ABP v. ERC

Doctrine: The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

Facts: ABP filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to declare as void ERC Resolution No. 1, Series of 2016 (ERC Clarificatory Resolution). The petition also seeks that this Court direct the ERC to disapprove the Power Supply Agreements (PSAs) of the Distribution Utilities (DUs) submitted after 7 November 2015 for failure to conduct Competitive Selection Process (CSP). The petition further asks the Court to order ERC to implement CSP in accordance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No. DC2015-06-0008 (2015 DOE Circular) and ERC Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015 (CSP Guidelines).

Issue: Whether or not ABP’s petition for certiorari and prohibition is correct.

Held: The ERC does not have the statutory authority to postpone the date of effectivity of CSP, and thereby cannot amend the 2015 DOE Circular.

Petitioner ABP correctly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Court.

[T]he remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution].

Not every abuse of discretion can be occasion for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion, such abuse must be grave."

Rivera-Avante v. Rivera

 Doctrine: Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays.

Facts: Herein petitioner is the registered owner of a house and lot located at 1404 Leroy St., Paco, Manila. Respondent Milagros Rivera (Milagros) is her sister-in-law, being the wife of her deceased brother, Alejandro. Petitioner claims that she and her husband allowed respondents to stay in the disputed premises out of compassion for respondent and in consideration of her deceased brother Alejandro. However, in 2005, petitioner and her husband, finding the need to utilize the subject property and in view of their plan to distribute the same to their children, demanded that respondents vacate the premises in question. Petitioner and her husband have, likewise, obtained information that respondents are financially able to rent their own place and, in fact, have acquired several residential properties and vehicles. However, respondents refused the demand of petitioner and her husband, and even filed a case questioning petitioner's ownership of the said property contending that they are, in fact, co-owners of the subject property and that petitioner obtained title over the disputed lot through fraud, deceit and falsification. Petitioner sent a formal demand letter on May 22, 2006 to respondents asking them to vacate the disputed premises, but this remained unheeded and then another letter on September 3, 2007 asking them to leave the subject property and to pay reasonable rent from the date of receipt of the said letter until they have fully vacated the questioned premises, but to no avail. Hence, petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case with the MeTC of Manila. The court ruled in favor of petitioner. 

Respondents filed an appeal with the RTC which was granted on the ground that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed beyond the one-year reglementary period required by the Rules of Court, thus, his remedy should have been an accion publiciana which should be filed with the RTC. The RTC, nonetheless, held that the MeTC correctly held that petitioner has the right to possess the disputed lot on the basis of the MeTC's provisional finding of ownership in her favor.

After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. CA affirmed the judgment of RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. CA ruled that this period is reckoned from petitioner's initial demand letter and not the latest demand letter because the latter was a mere reminder or reiteration of the original demand and, as such, does not operate to renew the one-year period within which to file the ejectment suit.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision in holding that the one-year period within which an unlawful detainer case must be filed is reckoned from the May 22, 2006 Demand Letter and not the September 7, 2007 Demand Letter as the final one.

Held: RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the letter of September 3, 2007, which is a mere reiteration of the original demand, will not operate to renew the one-year period within which petitioner should file her unlawful detainer case because the said period will still be counted from the date of the original demand which was made on May 22, 2006. Hence, on the basis of the foregoing discussions, the instant petition should be dismissed.

Moreover, the Court could not help but agree with the observations of respondents that the present petition is, likewise, dismissible on the ground that petitioner is guilty of a procedural transgression which the Court cannot simply ignore.

As correctly ruled by the CA, petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the questioned CA Decision was belatedly filed.

Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory.

Go-Yu v. Yu

 Doctrine: A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an original action, independent from the principal action, and not a part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. It "is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”

Facts: Petitioner filed with the RTC Davao a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property against the respondent. Petitioner was eventually diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was found to exist before the parties' marriage; and the fact that petitioner is comfortable with her behavior and sees nothing wrong with it or the need to change renders treatment improbable. Petitioner sought the dissolution of the parties' absolute community of properties claiming that their marriage is governed by the provisions of the Family Code and that they did not enter into any prenuptial agreement.

After petitioner has rested her case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming that petitioner's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which supposedly renders her psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, is not supported by clear evidence. RTC denied respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence. Respondent then filed a with the CA a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Orders of the RTC which denied his Demurrer to Evidence and his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. CA reversed and set aside the Orders of RTC and granted respondent's Demurrer to Evidence, thereby dismissing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property filed by petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari may be rendered moot by the mere continuation of the proceedings in the RTC.

Held: It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an original action, independent from the principal action, and not a part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. It "is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” As a consequence, "a petition for certiorari pending before a higher court does not necessarily become moot and academic by a continuation of the proceedings in the court of origin.” Hence, in the instant case, the special civil action for certiorari which respondent filed with the CA is independent from the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner. Being independent from the principal action, the petition for certiorari may not, thus, be rendered moot by the mere continuation of the proceedings in the RTC.

In her petition filed with the RTC, petitioner contends that her marriage to respondent is null and void from the beginning by reason of her psychological incapacity. However, the Court agrees with the CA that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's Demurrer to Evidence because petitioner was unable to present sufficient evidence to show that she has the right to the relief she seeks.

Lerias v. CA

 Doctrine: It is necessary for the applicant of the remedy of injunction to prove the following in order to obtain injunctive relief, namely: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) the right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

Facts: Spouses Yñiguez brought a complaint for quieting of title to property (with application for the issuance of a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction) against respondent Provincial Government of Southern Leyte and Philson Construction and Development Corporation in the RTC, alleging that they were the absolute owners of a parcel of commercial land located at Barangay Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Southern Leyte denied the alleged ownership. It insisted that the lot was sold to the Province of Leyte by Felix Aya-ay, as the guardian of then minors Josefina and Asuncion Oppus y Garces; that the sale was evidenced by the seller's affidavit and the buyer's affidavit, both of which were dated June 3, 1918; that the Province of Leyte paid the real property taxes starting in 1918; that upon its creation as a separate province, it (Southern Leyte) was given the lot; that it had owned the contested property since 1918 and had been in continued peaceful possession of the same; that the ownership of the Spouses Yñiguez was based on the deed of donation executed by Asuncion Oppus on May 28, 1986 of the lot purportedly covered by OCT No. 35 and TCT No. 150, but said lot was different from its lot; and that through fraud and misrepresentation, the Spouses Yñiguez had secured TCT No. T-1089 that eventually and fraudulently covered its lot.

The parties eventually entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by the RTC. Eventually, Southern Leyte, claiming that the compromise agreement had been entered into without authority of the Provincial Governor, initiated its action for annulment of the judgment in the CA. 

Subsequently, the Spouses donated the disputed property to the petitioner and Alfredo Yñiguez by virtue of a deed of donation. Also, while the action for annulment of judgment was pending in the CA, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to execute the judgment by compromise whereby she prayed, among others, that Southern Leyte should vacate the property and deliver the same to the victors in the suit. The RTC issued the writ of execution prayed for.

Southern Leyte applied for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin RTC and its sheriff from enforcing the judgment by compromise. CA issued the TRO followed by the writ of preliminary injunction.  The CA held that Southern Leyte had a clear right to be protected. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. She then brought this special civil action for certiorari to nullify CA’s resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held: Granted. It is necessary for the applicant of the remedy of injunction to prove the following in order to obtain injunctive relief, namely: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) the right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

Of utmost importance is the existence of a clear and unmistakable right to be protected on the part of the applicant. This is because injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights. Injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. In short, the showing must be made of an existing actual right to be protected and of the acts against which the writ is to be directed as violative of said right.

Although overwhelming evidence has not been necessary to establish the existence of the right to be protected, jurisprudence requires mere prima facie evidence of the right to be presented, or such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.

We find and rule that conformably with the foregoing standards Southern Leyte's right to be protected by injunction was not established, or was not shown to exist. Southern Leyte's claim to have owned the property since 1918 was supported only by the tax declaration. In contrast, the petitioner's ownership was registered under the Torrens system.

Yap v. Heirs of Pantalan (Moro)

 Doctrine: The rule that certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. While it is true that we have applied a liberal application of the rules of procedure in a number of cases, we have always stressed that this can be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. "To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantial justice.”

Facts: This case is rooted from claims over a parcel of land originally owned by Pantalan (Moro). In June 1990, said parcel of land was adjudged with finality to be owned by respondents the Licuanans in a case for Reconveyance, Nullity of Title, Damages, Attorney's Fees, Etc., filed by the Licuanans against the heirs of Pantalan (Moro). Yap, however, also claims ownership thereof, having allegedly acquired the same by sale from respondent Heirs of Pantalan (Moro), through a "private deed of sale" prepared and notarized by Atty. Nano. Hence, Yap filed this Complaint for Specific Performance, Reconveyance, Nullity of Titles, Damages, Attorney's Fees, Receivership, with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC of Lupon, Davao Oriental against the Heirs of Pantalan (Moro), the Licuanans, and Atty. Nano.

The Licuanans filed motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading. However, the Licuanans filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. RTC granted Licuanan’s Motion to dismiss.

Aggrieved, Yap filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to the CA. CA dismissed the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not certiorari may be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.

Held: No. The assailed RTC Orders before the CA were clearly final orders issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, which may be reviewed by an ordinary appeal. 

Nothing is more settled than the rule that certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. While it is true that we have applied a liberal application of the rules of procedure in a number of cases, we have always stressed that this can be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. "To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantial justice.” It should be emphasized that in this case, Yap did not offer any reasonable cause to justify its failure to avail of the proper remedy before the CA except for his defensive argument of laying the blame to his counsel's mistake or negligence and his invocation of this Court's exercise of liberality in order to accord him his day in court. Indeed, Yap has not been forthright about his procedural blunder. Time and again, we have ruled that utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.

Arroyo v. CA

Doctrine: Generally, courts may no longer review or modify a final and executory judgment. This is otherwise referred to as the principle of immutability of judgments, which dictates that once a decision becomes final, the enforcement or execution of the judgment becomes a purely ministerial act. This notwithstanding, the doctrine on immutability of judgments admits of the following exceptions: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgments rendering execution unjust and inequitable.

Facts: The enactment of RA No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997) merged the Office for the Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) and Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) as the organic offices of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The functions of the regional and field offices of the ONCC and OSCC were retained under the new organizational structure of the NCIP. The positions of Staff Directors, Bureau Directors, Deputy Executive Directors and Executive Directors, except the positions of Regional Directors and below were phased out. Absorbed personnel were nonetheless subject to the qualifications set by the Civil Service Commission and the Placement Committee created.

Brito who was then the Regional Director for Region V of the OSCC, was temporarily appointed to the same position. On August 31, 2000, Arroyo was appointed as the Regional Director of Region V. Unsatisfied with the appointment of Arroyo and three other appointees, Brito, holding the positions of Bureau Director and Regional Director, initiated a petition for quo warranto to challenge their appointment before the CA. CA partially granted the petition insofar as Brito and his co-petitioner Batay-an were concerned. The CA held that since Sec. 74 of RA No. 8371 did not phase out the Regional Director positions, the incumbent Regional Directors were retained, subject to the qualifications prescribed under Civil Service Rules and the standards set by the newly-created Placement Committee. Since Brito held an Executive Service Officer (CESO) Rank III eligibility, he possessed the necessary qualifications as Regional Director for Region V.

Arroyo moved for the reconsideration of the decision. Pending the resolution of her motion, Arroyo filed a Manifestation with the CA, citing newly discovered evidence supporting her claim that Brito did not obtain a bachelor’s degree, which is an academic qualification for the position fo Regional Director. The Office of the President (OP) affirmed the recommendation of PAGC to hold Brito liable for falsifying his scholastic records. However, CA remained unmoved by these arguments. The motion was denied.

Arroyo did not elevate the matter to the SC for review. This prompted Brito to file a Motion for Entry of Judgment and for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Arroyo opposed this motion and argued that the petition for quo warranto was rendered moot and academic by virtue of the decision of the OP. CA found that the decision granting the quo warranto petition had become final and executory. Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in directing the execution of its decision granting the quo warranto petition of Brito.

Held: Granted. It is true that the execution of a court’s judgment becomes a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal and no appeal was duly perfected. Generally, therefore, courts may no longer review or modify a final and executory judgment. This is otherwise referred to as the principle of immutability of judgments, which dictates that once a decision becomes final, the enforcement or execution of the judgment becomes a purely ministerial act. This notwithstanding, the doctrine on immutability of judgments admits of the following exceptions: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgments rendering execution unjust and inequitable. The Court applies these exceptions in order to serve the interests of justice. 

In this case, Arroyo invoked the last exception, which relates to supervening events. A supervening event, in order to apply, must rest on proven or certain facts. Hence, Arroyo should establish through competent evidence there are events, which transpired after the finality of the decision altered or modified the parties’ situation in such manner that renders execution of the judgment inequitable, impossible, or unfair. It should directly affect the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially change the rights or relations of the parties. While Arroyo raised the fact that Brito falsified his college degree in her motion for the reconsideration of the quo warranto decision, it was only on October 30, 2007 that the OP declared final its decision to dismiss and disqualify Brito from government service. By then, the period to appeal to the Court has lapsed without Arroyo filing an appeal, and Brito has commenced the execution of the quo warranto decision in his favor. Verily, the supervening event referred to in the present case transpired after the finality of the judgment that Brito sought to execute. 

Lacking the requisite qualifications for the controverted public office or position, the petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding may not raise the lack of qualification of the supposed usurper. This requirement necessarily proceeds from the ultimate relief that is granted to the individual initiating the quo warranto proceeding — which is ousting the incumbent and placing the challenger to the controverted position.

The final and executory judgment of the OP, finding Brito liable for falsification of his bachelor’s degree, has effectively rendered the execution of the quo warranto judgment impossible, inequitable, and unjust.

CIO-ALU v. CA

 Doctrine: The process of reviewing decisions of the labor tribunals has been settled with clarity in the leading case of St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998), where the SC held that review of NLRC’s decisions must be made before the CA by petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and then before the SC by petition for review under Rule 45, for the special civil action of certiorari is a distinct remedy from, and not a substitute for, appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. 

Facts: CIO-ALU is among the complainants in three cases against San Carlos Milling Company, Inc. (SCMCI) for unpaid wage increases, 13th month pay, differential pay, holiday pay, and separation pay. All three cases were eventually decided in favor of the SCMCI workers. This case arose during the consolidated proceedings for the execution of the aforesaid judgments. It all started from the Notice of Levy dated February 9, 2006 issued by Sheriff Paredes, advising the authorized representative or agents of SCMCI that he has to attach properties found inside the premises of SCMCI.

MBTC filed a Third-Party Claim, alleging, inter alia, that it is the owner of the properties to be levied pursuant to a certificate of sale issued to it after the public auction sale of the real and personal properties of SCMCI. Executive Labor Arbiter Acosta issued an Order approving MBTC’s Third Party Claim. CIO-ALU, subsequently, filed an ex parte motion to post indemnity bond which was granted by ELA Acosta in an Order dated June 9, 2006.

Pursuant to the June 2006 Acosta Order, Sheriff Paredes issued a Notice of Sale of Properties. On July 4, 2006, MBTC, without waiving its right to question the Notice of Sale issued by Sheriff Paredes, moved to quash the Writ of Execution and to cite Sheriff Paredes in contempt. In the mean time, CIO-ALU filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration against the June 2006 Acosta Order, which was granted.

MBTC filed a Notice of Appeal/Appeal Memorandum questioning the July 2006 Acosta Order. Nevertheless, Sheriff Paredes proceeded with the levy and auction of the items listed in the Notice of Sale, with CIO-ALU emerging as the highest bidder. ELA Acosta issued a Break Open Order commanding the NLRC Sheriff to proceed to the premises of SCMCI and satisfy the judgments awards in favor of the SCMCI workers. The Sheriff garnished and auctioned some of the properties of SCMCI. Aggrieved, MBTC filed a petition for injunction with prayer for TRO with the NLRC’s 4th Division. NLRC issued a TRO enjoining ELA Acosta, Sheriff Paredes and any person acting under their authority, as well as CIO-ALU and the SCMCI workers, from executing in whole or in part upon the properties subject of MBTC’s third-party claim. 

NLRC rendered a Decision giving due course to MBTC’s petition for injunction and invalidating the July 2006 Acosta Order. CIO-ALU sought reconsideration which was denied.

NLRC issued a Resolution denying MBTC’s motion for reconsideration. CIO-ALU, then, filed a motion to implement the October 2006 NLRC’s Resolution. Sheriff Paredes resumed the execution of the judgment award and took the properties covered by the Certificate of Sale issued to MBTC. To protect its rights and interests, MBTC instituted a complaint fo rreconveyance and recovery of personal properties with damages against CIO-ALU and Sheriff Paredes. RTC issued an Order enjoining CIO-ALU and the Sheriff of the NLRC from conducting further execution on all the properties located in the SCMCI compound/plant, effective upon MBTC’s filing of a bond.

MBTC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA ruled in favor of MBTC. CIO-ALU filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

Issues: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its judicial discretion in granting and declaring the MBTC’s petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious notwithstanding the admissions of the MBTC which refute the MBTC’s third-party claim and whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion by relying on the technicalities and disregarding substantive law.

Held: The petition should be dismissed. Prefatorily, it must be noted that while the petition filed by CIO-ALU with the Court was denominated as a “Petition for Review on Certiorari” presumably under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, its contents betray its actual nature as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The caption of the petition reads: “For: CERTIORARI under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.” 

Certiorari is not the proper remedy from a decision of the CA in a labor proceeding. The process of reviewing decisions of the labor tribunals has been settled with clarity in the leading case of St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, where the Court held that review of NLRC’s decisions must be made before the CA by petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and then before this Court by petition for review under Rule 45, for the special civil action of certiorari is a distinct remedy from, and not a substitute for, appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. Even if We exercise our judicial discretion and consider the petition as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45, We would still be constrained to deny the petition for being filed out of time. CIO-ALU received the assailed CA’s resolution on October 18, 2012; thus, it had 15 days from that date, or until November 2, 2012, to file the petition. However, the petition was filed only on December 28, 2012 — almost two months after the reglementary period under the Rules of Court had lapsed. 

A completed levy does not automatically mean that the judgment has already been satisfied. It has been held that mere levy on property of sufficient value to cover the judgment award does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment, but merely as a prima facie evidence or a presumption of satisfaction. Under the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to the NLRC’s Execution Manual, a levy only creates a lien over the property in favor of the judgment obligee. In order to afford full satisfaction of the judgment from the levied property, an execution sale must be conducted, and the proceeds therefrom be used to satisfy the judgment debt. Therefore, a money judgment is satisfied only upon payment of the judgment award or the issuance of a certificate of sale in favor of the judgment creditor after the conduct of an execution sale.