Lerias v. CA

 Doctrine: It is necessary for the applicant of the remedy of injunction to prove the following in order to obtain injunctive relief, namely: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) the right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

Facts: Spouses Yñiguez brought a complaint for quieting of title to property (with application for the issuance of a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction) against respondent Provincial Government of Southern Leyte and Philson Construction and Development Corporation in the RTC, alleging that they were the absolute owners of a parcel of commercial land located at Barangay Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Southern Leyte denied the alleged ownership. It insisted that the lot was sold to the Province of Leyte by Felix Aya-ay, as the guardian of then minors Josefina and Asuncion Oppus y Garces; that the sale was evidenced by the seller's affidavit and the buyer's affidavit, both of which were dated June 3, 1918; that the Province of Leyte paid the real property taxes starting in 1918; that upon its creation as a separate province, it (Southern Leyte) was given the lot; that it had owned the contested property since 1918 and had been in continued peaceful possession of the same; that the ownership of the Spouses Yñiguez was based on the deed of donation executed by Asuncion Oppus on May 28, 1986 of the lot purportedly covered by OCT No. 35 and TCT No. 150, but said lot was different from its lot; and that through fraud and misrepresentation, the Spouses Yñiguez had secured TCT No. T-1089 that eventually and fraudulently covered its lot.

The parties eventually entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by the RTC. Eventually, Southern Leyte, claiming that the compromise agreement had been entered into without authority of the Provincial Governor, initiated its action for annulment of the judgment in the CA. 

Subsequently, the Spouses donated the disputed property to the petitioner and Alfredo Yñiguez by virtue of a deed of donation. Also, while the action for annulment of judgment was pending in the CA, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to execute the judgment by compromise whereby she prayed, among others, that Southern Leyte should vacate the property and deliver the same to the victors in the suit. The RTC issued the writ of execution prayed for.

Southern Leyte applied for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin RTC and its sheriff from enforcing the judgment by compromise. CA issued the TRO followed by the writ of preliminary injunction.  The CA held that Southern Leyte had a clear right to be protected. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. She then brought this special civil action for certiorari to nullify CA’s resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held: Granted. It is necessary for the applicant of the remedy of injunction to prove the following in order to obtain injunctive relief, namely: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) the right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

Of utmost importance is the existence of a clear and unmistakable right to be protected on the part of the applicant. This is because injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights. Injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. In short, the showing must be made of an existing actual right to be protected and of the acts against which the writ is to be directed as violative of said right.

Although overwhelming evidence has not been necessary to establish the existence of the right to be protected, jurisprudence requires mere prima facie evidence of the right to be presented, or such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.

We find and rule that conformably with the foregoing standards Southern Leyte's right to be protected by injunction was not established, or was not shown to exist. Southern Leyte's claim to have owned the property since 1918 was supported only by the tax declaration. In contrast, the petitioner's ownership was registered under the Torrens system.