Pearson v. IAC

Facts:

Petitioners Alfred Pearson, et al. claims to have inherited the benificial interest of the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. upon its dissolution, owing to the fact that the biggest stockholder of said company and the sole owner of the claims was their ancestor, William F. Pearson, Sr.

Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. filed in 1919 the "BAROBO-1" to "BAROBO-5" placer claims located at the barrio of Bahi, municipality of Lianga, province of Surigao del Sur but were were destroyed or lost during the war.

In 1948, the Tambis Gold filed with the Bureau of Mines affidavits to reconstitute and was recorded in 1949. In 1960, Tambis Gold was dissolved.

In 1970, respondent Rosario Mining through its agent Marcelino Manabat, discovered and located the "MARTIN-1", "MARTIN- 2", "MARTIN-5", "MARTIN-6" and "MARTIN-27" placer claims in the barrio of Bahi, municipality of Barobo, province of Surigao del Sur. The declarations of location were registered with the Mining Recorder of Surigao del Sur. The application for the survey of the "MARTIN" claims were filed, and the corresponding orders for survey were issued.

Rosario Mining filed the lease application covering the "MARTIN" placer claims. After the survey returns of said placer claims were, the notice of lease was published in the issues of the "Mindanao Times" and the "Times Journal".

Meanwhile, Diamond Mining, through its agent Justiniano Deloso, discovered and located the "DIAMOND-1" to "DIAMOND-7" placer claims in the barrio of Bahi, minicipality of Barobo, province of Surigao del Sur. The declarations of location were registered with the Mining Recorder of Surigao del Sur. The application for survey of the "DIAMOND" placer claims were filed, and, on May 21, 1974, the order for survey was issued. Diamond Mining filed the lease applications covering the "DIAMOND" placer claims. Subsequently, after the survey returns of said claims were approved, the notice of lease application was published in the the issues of the "Times Jornal" and the "Mindanao Times".

The petitioners filed the adverse claims against private respondents.

After the case was heard by the Panel of Investigators of the Bureau of Mines, the Director of Mines rendered the decision appealed from.

In his decision, the Director held that appellants (petitioners) failed to establish the existence of the conflict among the placer claims involved; that the "BAROBO" placer claims are null and void because their tie points, as described in the affidavits to reconstitute the declarations of location therefor, are not the natural objects or permanent monuments prescribed under the law and their geographical positions cannot be accurately determined; that, even if said "BAROBO" claims were validly located, the same have been abandoned due to the failure of the original locators thereof to perform assessment works therein, to file the corresponding affidavits of annual work obligations, and to pay the real estate taxes thereon; and that appellants (petitioners) are not the successors-in-interest of the Tambis Gold, hence they have no legal personality to institute the adverse claims."

On appeal, the Minister of Natural Resources in a Decision, affirmed the judgment of the Director of Mines He agreed with the Director's finding on the issue of abandonment.

Not satisfied with the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, the Pearsons appealed to the Office of the President. They filed a Manifestation requesting the Office to require the Mining Companies to file a bond in such amount as may be necessary to protect the interest of the Pearsons during the pendency of the case before it. Also, they prayed for an order for immediate ocular inspection of the area to determine the fundamental issue of the correct tie point of the controverted mining claims.

The Office of the President granted the motion concerning the bond but denied the request for ocular inspection. In the order, it was stated that "the investigation conducted by the Presidential Investigating Committee of Bureau of Mines has already considered and determined the issue which require no more (sic) further verification and clarification." The Pearsons and the Mining Companies separately moved for reconsideration.

Subsequently, the Office of the President granted the motion for ocular inspection, and ordered the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee. The Mining Companies moved for reconsideration of this order.

The Office of the President revoked the order allowing ocular inspection, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, and released all monies that might have been deposited by the Mining Companies.

CFI ordered the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee "to determine the correct tie-point of private respondents' mineral claim". Both the public and private respondents moved for reconsideration of said order. The CFI denied both motions and issued the Order scheduling an ocular inspection.

Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent IAC committed reversible error in assuming jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's interlocutory orders?

2. Assuming the IAC had validly assumed jurisdiction, whether or not it committed reversible errors of law in its decision now before us?

Held:

On the first issue, no reversible error committed by the IAC when it assumed jurisdiction over private respondents' petition for certiorari involving interlocutory order of the trial court.

The petitioners launch a two-pronged attack against the jurisdiction of the respondent appeallate court, to wit: first, the IAC could not adjudicate cases where the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue; and second, the orders of the CFI, being merely interlocutory, could not be the subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC.

The petitioners err on both counts.

Firstly, the IAC correctly invoked the ruling of this Court in Uytiepo vs. Aggabao, the wit:

"As regards the claim that the issues raised by Aggabao in her action filed with the respondent Court of Appeals involve only questions of law and are therefore exclusively reviewable by this Court, the petitioners apparently confuse the remedy of special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 30 of the Judiciary Act as amended and an appeal by certiorari under Rule 42 also of the Rules of Court in relation to the court fourth paragraph of section 17 of the same Act. The first is a remedy available in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, essentially to correct errors of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The second lies within the competence of this Court for the review of errors of inferior courts involving only questions of law. x x x ."

What private respondents availed of was the first remedy, placing in issue the jurisdiction of the

trial court to create an Ad Hoc Committee and Schedule an ocular inspection.

Secondly, petitioner's contention that the lower court's orders being merely interlocutory, are not correctible by certiorari, ignores this Court's consistent ruling, to wit:

"On the procedural issues raised, we hold that where an interlocutory order was allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such order may be questioned before the Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. To delay the review of the order until the appeal from the decision of the main case would not afford the party adversely affected by the said order a speedy, plain and adequate remedy."

In Marcelo vs. De Guzman, we held that although, as a general rule, an interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits, an exception is made where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief. In such exception, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party. We further held that where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal. This we reiterated in Salcedo-Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals.

To begin with the lower court did not have jurisdiction over the mining dispute. With the issuance of Presidential Decree Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463, the procedure of adjudicating conflicting mining claims has been made completely administrative in character, with the president as the final appeal authority. Section 50 of P.D. 463, providing for a modernized system of administration and disposition of mineral lands, to promote and encourage the development and exploitation thereof, mandates on the matter of "Protests, Adverse Claims and Appeals," the following procedure:

"Appeals - Any party not statisfied with the decision or order of the Director may, within five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the President of the Phillippines whose decision shall be final and executory."

It should be noted that before its amendment, the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137) required that after the filing of adverse claim with the Bureau of Mines, the adverse claimant had to go to a court of competent jurisdiction for the settlement of the claim.

The trend at present is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. This does not mean that administrative bodies have complete rein over mining disputes.

The controversies to be submitted and resolved by the Director of Mines under the sections referred only to the overlapping of claims and administrative matters incidental thereto Question and controversies that are judicial, not administrative, in nature can be resolved only by the regular counts in whom is vested the judicial power to resolve and adjudicate such civil disputes and controversies between litigants in accordance with the established norms of law and justice. Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have recognized a distinction between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative nature, such as "granting of lisence, permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling applications, or deciding conflicting applications," and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.

Well established is the rule that findings of fact made in the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources (then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) appealed from will not be reviewed by this Court unless there has been a grave abuse of discretion in making said findings by reason of the total absence of competent evidence in support thereof.

There is no showing that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of the Office of the President or a department head in rendering a questioned decision; nor a total lack of substantial evidence to support their administrative decisions, their factual findings and conclusion are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be interfered with.