Chapter 2
Reyes v. Sisters of Mary Hospital
Facts: Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. The other petitioners were their children. Five days before his death on January 8, 1987, Jorge had been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. After he failed to get relief from some home medication he was taking, which consisted of analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor.
Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered a Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge. Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and malarial smear were also made. The result was positive. As her shift was only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes.
Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. Jorge was given two doses on different times. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He was forty years old. The cause of his death was "Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.”
Petitioners filed before RTC Cebu City a complaint for damages. Their principal contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Instead, his death was due to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin.
Respondents denied the charges.
Petitioners offered the testimony of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, Chief Pathologist at the Northern Mindanao Training Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Vacalares performed an autopsy on Jorge Reyes to determine the cause of his death. However, he did not open the skull to examine the brain. His findings showed that the gastro-intestinal tract was normal and without any ulceration or enlargement of the nodules. Dr. Vacalares testified that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. He also stated that he had not seen a patient die of typhoid fever within five days from the onset of the disease.
For their part, respondents offered the testimonies of Dr. Peter Gotiong and Dr. Ibarra Panopio. Dr. Gotiong is a diplomate in internal medicine whose expertise is microbiology and infectious diseases. He is also a consultant at the Cebu City Medical Center and an associate professor of medicine at the South Western University College of Medicine in Cebu City. He had treated over a thousand cases of typhoid patients. According to Dr. Gotiong, the patient’s history and positive Widal Test results ratio of 1:320 would make him suspect that the patient had typhoid fever. As to Dr. Vacalares’ observation regarding the absence of ulceration in Jorge’s gastro-intestinal tract, Dr. Gotiong said that such hyperplasia in the intestines of a typhoid victim may be microscopic. He noted that since the toxic effect of typhoid fever may lead to meningitis, Dr. Vacalares’ autopsy should have included an examination of the brain.
The other doctor presented was Dr. Ibarra Panopio, a member of the American Board of Pathology, examiner of the Philippine Board of Pathology from 1978 to 1991, fellow of the Philippine Society of Pathologist, associate professor of the Cebu Institute of Medicine, and chief pathologist of the Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Hospital in Toledo City. Dr. Panopio stated that although he was partial to the use of the culture test for its greater reliability in the diagnosis of typhoid fever, the Widal Test may also be used. Like Dr. Gotiong, he agreed that the 1:320 ratio in Jorge’s case was already the maximum by which a conclusion of typhoid fever may be made. No additional information may be deduced from a higher dilution. He said that Dr. Vacalares’ autopsy on Jorge was incomplete and thus inconclusive.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred.
Held: Petitioners correctly observe that the medical profession is one which, like the business of a common carrier, is affected with public interest. Moreover, they assert that since the law imposes upon common carriers the duty of observing extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers, physicians and surgeons should have the same duty toward their patients. They also contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it allegedly assumed that the level of medical practice is lower in Iligan City, thereby reducing the standard of care and degree of diligence required from physicians and surgeons in Iligan City.
The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. It is a right earned through years of education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the state through professional board examinations. Such license may, at any time and for cause, be revoked by the government. In addition to state regulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an ancient code of discipline and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves in recognition and acceptance of their great responsibility to society. Given these safeguards, there is no need to expressly require of doctors the observance of "extraordinary" diligence. As it is now, the practice of medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence. And, as we have already noted, the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of Appeals called it, the reasonable "skill and competence . . . that a physician in the same or similar locality . . . should apply.”
Linsangan v. Tolentino
Facts: Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of his paralegal, Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. Gregorio attested that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of 50K.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is ambulance chasing
Held: Yes. Ambulance chasing is the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment. Complainant presented substantial evidence.
Zarzona Medical Clinic v. PHIC
Facts: A complaint was filed against petitioner ZMC for violation of Sec. 149 of Revised IRR of RA 7875 or National Health Insurance Act of 1995. Sec. 149 penalizes any health care provider that increases the period of actual confinement of any patient with revocation of accreditation.
ZMC was found liable.
Issue: Whether or not he CA erred
Held: ZMC is not guilty. We are inclined to give more credence to Alestre’s Affidavit, which is essentially a recantation of her previous Salaysay, for the following reasons: First, Alestre has fully explained to our satisfaction why she initially misdeclared her dates of confinement in ZMC. In her desire to report and be compensated for one day of work, Alestre hied back and forth between school and the hospital. It is difficult to believe that she would risk her reputation as a public school teacher, as well as prosecution for violation of civil service rules, to be an abettor of ZMC. Second, Alestre truly cannot be in two places at the same time. But her narration clearly accounts for her whereabouts on 12 August 2003. She travelled at least 3 times to and from the hospital and school. She admitted that the school was a mere ten-minute drive away from the hospital so she can easily traverse between the two locations. Third, ZMC had in fact admitted to its error in indicating the dates of Alestre’s confinement so there is no reason for ZMC to further conceal the actual days of Alestre’s confinement. Fourth, the Salaysay is not notarized. While recantation is frowned upon and hardly given much weight in the determination of a case, the affidavit is still a notarized document which carries in its favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same.
Professional Services v. CA
Facts: PSI, together with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes were impleaded by Agana spouses and later, their heirs in a complaint for damages filed in the RTC QC for the injuries suffered by Natividad when the doctors neglected to remove from her body two gauzes which were used in the surgery they performed.
RTC held PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. CA absolved Dr. Fuentes.
Issue: Whether a hospital may be held liable for the negligence of physicians-consultants allowed to practice in its premises
Held: PSI is liable. PSI took no heed of the record of operation and consequently did not initiate a review of what transpired during Natividad’s operation. Rather, it shirked its responsibility and passed it on to others — to Dr. Ampil whom it expected to inform Natividad, and Natividad herself to complain before it took any meaningful step.
Judge Castro Vda. de Mijares v. (Ret.) Justice Villaluz
Facts: Complainant, a widow, married respondent. She later learned from a Manila RTC Judge that respondent is married. Complainant charged respondent with gross immorality and grave misconduct. CA found respondent guilty.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty
Held: Yes.
Ulep v. The Legal Clinic
Facts: Petitioner contends that respondent’s advertisements (Guam Divorce) are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community int he integrity of the members of the bar.
Issue: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Held: Yes. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained.
Chapter 3
Terri Schiavo Case
In Nov. 1998, Michael, Terri’s husband, sought permission to remove his wife’s feeding tube.Terri suffered brain damage in Feb 1990. In Feb 2000, she had been ruled by a Florida Circuit Court to be in a persistent vegetative state. Her feeding tube was removed first on Apr. 26, 2001 but was reinserted 2 days later on an appeal by her parents, the Schindlers.
On Oct 10, 2003, the appeal was dismissed. 5 days later, her feeding tube was removed. On Oct 21, Florida Legislature passed Terri’s Law. Gov. Bush immediately ordered the feeding tube reinserted. On May 19, 2004, the law was overturned as it summarily deprived Florida citizens of their right to privacy.
Bush appealed to the Florida SC, supported by her parents. Michael opposed. On Sept. 23, 2004, the law was declared unconsti because of separation of powers. On Jan 24, 2005, US SC refused to hear the case.
Terri’s feeding tube was removed again on Mar 18, 2005.
Chapter 4
People v. Likiran alias Loloy
Facts: It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was being held at the basketball court. Jerome Likiran punched Mercado in the face. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that Jerome was armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife. Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular area.
RTC found accused-appellant guilty. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Held: No. In this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime has been adequately established by the prosecution, more particularly by the testimony of Dagangon.
Certificate of Death:
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause: DOA
Antecedent cause: Multiple GSW
Underlying cause: Stab wound scapular area (L)
The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause of death.
Chapter 5
Dela Cruz v. People
Facts: In the prosecution’s version, NBI received a complaint from Corazon and Charito. They claimed that Ariel, the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. They met James who demanded money in exchange for Ariel’s release.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the complainants. During the operation, the officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder.
In the defense’s version, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. His urine was extracted and he was not allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample.
RTC Cebu found dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was afforded due process
Held: No. The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
Roma Drug v. RTC
Facts: NBI and BFAD conducted a raid on petitioner Roma Drug (sole proprietor: Rodriguez) It appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around the same time upon the request of SmithKline. The seized medicines, which were manufactured by SmithKline, were imported directly from abroad and not purchased through the local SmithKline, the authorized Philippine distributor of these products.
Rodriguez was charged for violation of Section 4 (in relation to Sections 3 and 5) of RA No. 8203, also known as the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs. The section prohibits the sale of counterfeit drugs, which under Section 3(b)(3), includes "an unregistered imported drug product.”
In this case, there is no doubt that the subject seized drugs are identical in content with their Philippine-registered counterparts. There is no claim that they were adulterated in any way or mislabeled at least. Their classification as "counterfeit" is based solely on the fact that they were imported from abroad and not purchased from the Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the drugs.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8203 is constitutional
Held: The absurd results from this far-reaching ban extends to implications that deny the basic decencies of humanity. The law would make criminals of doctors from abroad on medical missions of such humanitarian organizations such as the International Red Cross, the International Red Crescent, Medicin Sans Frontieres, and other like-minded groups who necessarily bring their own pharmaceutical drugs when they embark on their missions of mercy. After all, they are disabled from invoking the bare "personal use" exemption afforded by the SLCD.
Even worse is the fact that the law is not content with simply banning, at civil costs, the importation of unregistered drugs. It equates the importers of such drugs, many of whom motivated to do so out of altruism or basic human love, with the malevolents who would alter or counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs for reasons of profit at the expense of public safety. Note that the SLCD is a special law, and the traditional treatment of penal provisions of special laws is that of malum prohibitum–or punishable regardless of motive or criminal intent. For a law that is intended to help save lives, the SLCD has revealed itself as a heartless, soulless legislative piece.
The challenged provisions of the SLCD apparently proscribe a range of constitutionally permissible behavior. It is laudable that with the passage of Rep. Act No. 9502, the State has reversed course and allowed for a sensible and compassionate approach with respect to the importation of pharmaceutical drugs urgently necessary for the people’s constitutionally-recognized right to health.
Chapter 6
People v. Ritter
Facts: Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot, who were street children, inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel in Olongapo City. Ritter masturbated Ramirez and then inserted his penis inside Rosario’s vagina. Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another occasion wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks.
7 months later, Rosario died. Ritter was arrested in Manila after he was identified by Jessie.
Issue: Whether or not Ritter is guilty of rape with homicide
Held: No. The foreign object inserted was not of Ritter but of a Black man, 3 months before she died. Her encounter with Ritter was 7 months before she died. She was also beyond 12 years of age when it happened. There is statutory rape when the age of the child is below 12 years. Rosario and Jessie were also paid by Ritter, an indication that she may have been a prostitute. She died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
Arroyo v. CA
Facts: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before RTC Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo. RTC convicted Vera and Arroyo. CA affirmed and denied the MR.
Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complain ant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later on traded marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred
Held: No. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is, therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings." In fine, the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no such acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons; and Dr. Neri promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair.
Ventura v. Samson
Facts: Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura executed a Sworn Statement that the crime of RAPE was committed against her person when she was merely 13 years of age by herein Respondent, then 38 years of age and married. She was sleeping in the maid’s room when the respondent entered the room, kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She was also asked to go to the farm where he sexually abused her. He gave her 500 pesos and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.
After the preliminary investigation, the crime of rape was dismissed and found probable cause for qualified seduction. Board of Governors of the IBP found him guilty of immorality and suspended respondent from the practice of law for 5 years.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of immorality
Held: Yes. Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the circumstances. In this case, respondents gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
Silverio v. People
Facts: Silverio alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the US. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. He underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to “female."
RTC ruled in favor of Silverio. CA ruled in favor of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is allowed to change his name and his sex in his birth certificate
Held: No. Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
As for the change of his sex, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
Chapter 7
People v. Umawid
Facts: Vicente was staying with his 2-year old granddaughter, Maureen, at the terrace of their house located at Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a panabas with neither reason nor provocation. While Vicente was able to evade Umawid’s blows, the latter nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Upon seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away.
Jeffrey, Umawid’s nephew, was awakened by the commotion, Jeffrey went outside only to see his uncle charging at him with his panabas. He, along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the house for safety. Eventually, Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latter’s fingers. Umawid only stopped his barrage upon seeing Jeffrey, who was then pretending to be dead, leaning on the wall and blood-stained.
Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the witness stand to attest to the same.
RTC found Umawid guilty of murder and frustrated murder. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not Umawid is guilty of murder and frustrated murder
Held: The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on this matter must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense/s with which he is charged. Umawid’s defense of insanity remained unsubstantiated.
Chapter 8
In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa
June de Villa v. The Director, New Bilibid Prisons
Facts: Aileen Mendoza woke up in her family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, to find petitioner on top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza. SHe gave birth to Leahlyn Mendoza.
Petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. He further averred that Aileen's family had been holding a grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. His alibi was he was in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas.
RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. SC affirmed the decision.
After 3 years, petitioner-relator filed a petition for habeas corpus. He gathered DNA samples of the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, Reynaldo de Villa, and Leahlyn Mendoza.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn’s.
Issue: Whether or not a new trial is proper in view of the newly discovered evidence.
Held: It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individual's guilt.
Chapter 9
PAL v. CA
Facts: PAL took off in Iloilo on its way to Manila but it crashed on Mt. Baco, Mindoro. One of the fatalities was Nicanor Padilla. His mother filed a complaint against PAL demanding payment of P600,000 as actual and compensatory damages, plus exemplary damages and P60,000 as attorney's fees. PAL denied that the accident was caused by its negligence or that of any of the plane's flight crew, and that, moreover, the damages sought were excessive and speculative.
The RTC judgment reads: judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc. to pay the plaintiff Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla the sum of P477,000.00 as award for the expected income of the deceased Nicanor; P10,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
Issue: Whether or not the damages is excessive
Held: Since Nicanor Padilla was only 29 years old and in good health, the trial court allowed him a life expectancy of 30 years. Multiplying his annual net income of P13,900 by his life expectancy of 30 years, the product is P417,000 which is the amount of death indemnity due his mother and only forced heir. The petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent or her heirs death indemnity in the sum of P417,000, with legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from the date of the judgment on August 31, 1973, until it is fully paid.
LBC Cargo v. CA
Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred between Rogelio Monterola, on a motorcycle, and Jaime Tano, Jr., driving a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo Incorporated. Montelora died.
A criminal case for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed against Tano. A civil suit was likewise instituted by the heirs of deceased Monterola against Tano, along with Fernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the recovery of damages.
RTC dismissed the cases on the ground that the proximate cause of the "accident" was the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola. CA reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding Tano negligent.
Held: No. From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle.
In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact; that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.
However, the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following. There indeed was contributory negligence on the victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners liability for damages.
Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro NOT MY DIGEST
FACTS:
1. Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
2. In 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
3. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
4. The petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC Pasig City, in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
5. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
6. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Issue: Whether petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the second Criminal Case of Reckless Imprudence.
Held: YES. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty. He already admitted his guilt to the first criminal case, thus barring prosecution of another case of similar nature. Since both cases, 1) Reckless imprudence resulting to Slight Physical Injuries and 2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property were prosecuted based on the same RPC Art. 365.
Hence, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first-level court.
Chapter 10
Stronghold Insurance v. CA
Facts: Cesar Rivera, a contract worker, was hired by Erectors, Inc. Erectors as helper electrician at the International Airport Project in Baghdad, Iraq. In compliance with the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Labor and Employment Erectors secured a group accident insurance from petitioner.
Cesar Rivera died of heart attacked. Private respondent Felicitas Rivera, filed her claim with Stronghold for death benefits. Petitioner however refused to pay and satisfy her claim. The body of the deceased was exhumed and autopsied by the NBI which stated that No cause of death can be given due to the absence of internal organs.
Rivera instituted an action against Stronghold and presented a witness to support her claim that her husband died due to an accident. The Commission dismissed the case. CA reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the cause of the accident was within the coverage of the policy
Held: No. Private respondent has clearly shown that an accident immediately preceded the death of Cesar Rivera. His accidental fall was the proximate cause or "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred” which led to the death of Cesar Rivera although the immediate cause thereof may have been myocardial infarction.
People v. Operaña
Facts: Appellant was charged in the RTC with the crime of parricide for killing his wife.
An exhumation followed by an autopsy of the remains of the deceased was conducted. According to Dr. Bandonill’s report, the presence of multiple injuries all over the body and the suspicious presence of multiple abrasions on the area of the neck not related to the hanging gives the suicidal aspect a big question mark. With respect to the said "suspicious" multiple abrasions on the neck, the same were clarified by the same doctor as "[a]brasions, multiple, with signs of strangulation, encircling the neck, at an area of 32.0 cms. x 4.5 cms., just below the thyroid cartilage.” Aside from the said abrasions, there were 12 abrasions and 1 contusion found on the body of the deceased.
Dr. Tomas Cornel, physician and Asst. City Health Officer of Dagupan City performed a post-mortem examination 3 days after her death. She was removed from her coffin. He found multiple abrasions, which might have been caused by hanging or by excessive force of strangulation.
RTC found Operaña guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred
Held: No, the lower court did not err in concluding that the presumption of innocence of appellant has been overwhelmingly overcome by the totality of the physical and testimonial evidence against him. The aforesaid circumstances, as presented, constitute an unbroken chain leading to no other conclusion than that the appellant is guilty of the crime charged. The blood of his lamented wife Alicia is on his hands.
Chapter 11
People v. Caranto
Facts: In the version of the prosecution, PO2 Arago of PNP Taguig City was approached by an informant of the widespread selling of methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu by a certain Jojo in Tipas, Taguig City. A buy-bust operation was organized where the policemen acted as poseur buyer. They used the marked 500 pesos to buy shabu from Jerry.
In Jerry’s version, policemen arrived from their house and looked for his father but the police forced their way inside. He was then arrested. He alleged that the chain of custody was broken.
Issue: Whether or not the chain of custody was broken
Held: Yes. The Court found that the evidence obtained was contaminated. In the testimony of the officers, it was found that the shabu was improperly marked as dictated by law. Instead, it was put inside the pocket of one of the officers.
Since the chain of custody was broken from the beginning, the shabu is inadmissible in evidence. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt Jerry’s guilt in selling shabu.
Chapter 12
Valenzuela v. People NOT MY DIGEST
FACTS: Petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the SM complex along North EDSA, by Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a pushcart with cases of detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.
ISSUE: Is the crime committed frustrated or consummated theft?
HELD: The crime is consummated. The following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. There was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking.
So long as the descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. Insofar as we consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
Chapter 13
Matrixx Initiatives Inc. v. Siracusano NOT MINE ALSO
Facts of the case: Investors in Matrixx Inititiatives, Inc. ("Matrixx") filed suit against the company in an Arizona federal district court for violations of federal securities laws. The investors alleged that Matrixx failed to disclose that one of its products, Zicam nasal spray/gel, caused anosmia (the loss of the sense of smell) in numerous customers. The district court dismissed the case holding that the investors failed to alleged "materiality" in their claim because their evidence was not "statistically significant.”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the investors had pled sufficient facts going to the issue of materiality in order to avoid dismissal. The court reasoned that whether facts are statistically significant, and thus, material, is a question of fact that should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact – usually the jury. Here, the district court erred when it took liberties in making that determination on its own.
Question: Can a plaintiff state a claim under the Securities Exchange Act based on a pharmaceutical company's non-disclosure of adverse event reports even though the reports are not alleged to be statistically significant?
Conclusion: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The court ruled that the materiality of a pharmaceutical company's non-disclosure of adverse event reports in a securities fraud action does not depend upon whether there is a statistically significant health risk.
Chapter 14
Borromeo v. Family Care
Facts: Petitioner brought his wife to the Family Care Hospital because she had been complaining of acute pain at the lower stomach area and fever for two days. Dr Inso suspected that Lilian might be suffering from acute appendicitis. Tests were ordered but the tests were not conclusive enough to confirm that she had appendicitis.
Her condition did not improve. She abruptly developed an acute surgical abdomen. Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory laparotomy on Lilian. The operation was successful.
Roughly six hours after Lilian was brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was informed that her blood pressure was low and she was pale. Her condition worsened despite Dr. Inso’s actions. Dr. Inso informed her family that there may be a need to re-operate on her, but she would have to be put in an ICU, but Family Care does not have one because it was only a secondary hospital.
Dr. Inso personally called Perpetual but they had no available bed. He then personally coordinated with MMC. Upon reaching the MMC, a medical team was on hand to resuscitate Lilian. However, she passed away.
Lilian’s body was autopsied by PNP. Dr. Reyes concluded that the cause of Lilian’s death was hemorrhage due to internal bleeding. He gave his opinion that Lilian’s death could have been avoided if Dr. Inso had repaired the site with double suture rather than a single suture. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for damages.
Dr. Reyes admitted that he had very little experience in the field of pathology.
Family Care presented Dr. Ramos and Dr. Hernandez, both expert witnesses. Both of them testified that Lilian’s death could not be attributed to the alleged wrong suturing but due to hemorrhage due to DIC.
RTC awarded the damages to the petitioner. CA reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not Family Care is negligent in caring Lilian
Held: No. A medical professional has the duty to observe the standard of care and exercise the degree of skill, knowledge, and training ordinarily expected of other similarly trained medical professionals acting under the same circumstances. A breach of the accepted standard of care constitutes negligence or malpractice and renders the defendant liable for the resulting injury to his patient.
The standard is based on the norm observed by other reasonably competent members of the profession practicing the same field of medicine. Because medical malpractice cases are often highly technical, expert testimony is usually essential to establish: (1) the standard of care that the defendant was bound to observe under the circumstances; (2) that the defendant’s conduct fell below the acceptable standard; and (3) that the defendant’s failure to observe the industry standard caused injury to his patient. The petitioner failed to present an expert witness.
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