People v. Gaborne

Facts:

Rey Perfecto De Luna (De Luna) and Sixto Elizan (Elizan) entered a videoke bar at Barangay Mugdo, Hinabangan, Samar. Noli Abayan (Abayan), appellant and Joselito Bardelas (Bardelas) followed five minutes thereafter. While Elizan and De Luna were drinking, singing and merely having fun, four successive gunshots were fired through the window. Elizan and De Luna were hit from behind. De Luna and Marialinisa Pasana (Pasana) saw appellant, who was then wearing a black t-shirt and a black cap, holding a gun aimed at their location. Pasana also saw accused-appellant and Bardelas escape after the incident. Elizan and De Luna were brought to St. Paul's Hospital at Tacloban City. Unfortunately, Elizan was pronounced dead upon arrival while De Luna survived.

Appellant’s alibi: According to him, he and his companions ordered for bottles of beer. However, when they tried to order for more bottles, the waitress refused to give them their order unless they pay for their previous orders first. While Abayan was explaining to the father of the owner of the videoke bar, appellant and Bardelas went out to urinate, however, the waitress locked the front door. While standing outside, he heard the waitress utter the words, "If you will not pay, I [will] have you killed, all of you, right this moment. He also consistently contend that it was a man wearing black shirt and camouflage pants who fired shots to the videoke bar, not him.

The following day, appellant and Bardelas were arrested and underwent paraffin test.

RTC found him guilty of the two 2 charges of Murder with the use of Unlicensed Firearm and Frustrated Murder. Abayan and Bardelas were acquitted. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met in the case at bar.

Held:

Yes.

The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

ARTICLE 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

The requisites of treachery are: (1) The employment of means method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution. In this case, the hapless victims were merely drinking and singing in-front of the videoke machine when shot by the appellant. The firing was so sudden and swift that they had no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate. Furthermore, appellant's acts of using a gun and even going out of the videoke bar evidently show that he consciously adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime.

In addition, the lower courts appropriately found appellant liable for the crime of Frustrated Murder.

A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

Intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly ever an essential element of a crime. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.

Evidently, accused-appellant's intent to kill was established beyond reasonable doubt. This can be seen from his act of shooting Elizan and De Luna from behind with a firearm while they were innocently singing and drinking.

In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential Decree No. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder. It is clear from the foregoing that where murder results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is not qualified illegal possession but, murder. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance. Thus, where murder was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The intent of Congress is to treat the offense of illegal possession of firearm and the commission of homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed firearm as a single offense.

In the case at hand, since it was proven that accused-appellant was not a licensed firearm holder, and that he was positively identified by the witnesses as the one who fired shots against the victims, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder should be considered as an aggravating circumstance thereof.