Dizon v. Commanding General

Facts:

An Agreement was concluded between the Philippines and the United States of America whereby the US is authorized to occupy and use certain portions of the Philippine territory as military bases and to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within and outside said bases. For an offense allegedly committed at the main storage area, Philrycom Engineer Depot, United States Army, APO 900, located at Quezon City, Philippines, the petitioner was prosecuted in and convicted by a General Court Martial appointed by the Commanding General of the Philippine-Ryukus Command of the United States Army and accordingly sentenced to confinement at hard labor for five years.

In his petition for habeas corpus, petitioners contends that the General Court Martial had no jurisdiction over the alleged offense which was committed in a place not a base of the United States Army within the meaning of the Agreement concerning military bases of March 14, 1947, and that even assuming that the offense was committed in a base, said Agreement is unconstitutional because it deprives the Philippine courts of the jurisdiction over all offenses exclusively vested in them by Article VIII, section 1, of the Constitution, and violates section 1 of Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing to every person in the Philippines due process and equal protection of the law.

Article XXI of the Agreement provides that "the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary quarters and installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex B" (paragraph 1) and that "the terms of this Agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article while they are so occupied by the armed forces of the United States; provided, that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall no be considered as offenses within the bases" (paragraph 3).

As said temporary installation is not located within the limits of the City of Manila, the terms of the Agreement pertaining to bases are applicable thereto by virtue of the provision of paragraph 3 of Article XXI already above quoted. Accordingly, the offense in question falls under the jurisdiction of the United States as a consequence of Article XIII of the Agreement which stipulates that "the Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over . . . any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender and offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines . . ." (paragraph 1).

Issue:

Whether or not the Agreement is constitutional

Held:

A foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. By virtue of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, the generally accepted principles of international law have been adopted as part of the law of the Nation. In like manner, there would be not be an unconstitutional derogation of the jurisdiction of the local courts if we are recognized the immunities of foreign sovereigns and ministers.

In the absence of an express declaration in the Constitution that the generally accepted principles of international law are made a part of the law of the Nation, the Court is bound to uphold the immunities above referred to. And this should be true as long as the civilized world or majority of the independent countries composing it still abide by the rules of the international law, and as long as the Philippines continues, as it must continue, to have an intercourse with such countries. "A nation would justify be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world." (The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon and Others, 3 Law. ed., 287.)

Under the Agreement, the United States was given express permission to establish military bases on certain portions of the Philippine territory and to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses. The rights thus granted are no less than those conceded by the rule of international law to "a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign." For this reason, if for no other, the constitutional point raised by the petitioner becomes untenable. The jurisdiction granted to the United States under the Agreement may be wider than what is recognized by international law, but the facts remains that the lesser right is fundamentally as much a diminution of the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts as the greater right. If the latter right were to be invoked in the absence of the Agreement, there is every reason to state that:

The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extend in that power which could impose such restriction. (The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon and Others, 3 Law. ed., 287, 293.)

The principle that as a rule "the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain portions of said territory.

In further support of the Agreement in question, the argument may be advanced that the Philippine Independence Act, approved by the United States Congress on March 24, 1934, reserves to the United States the right to have and acquire naval reservations and fueling stations in the Philippines. (See section 10, in connection with section 5.) In the Joint Resolution approved by the United States Congress on June 29, 1944, it was provided (section 2) that "after negotiation with the President of Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the President of the Philippine Republic, the President of the United States is hereby authorized by such means as he finds appropriate to withhold or to acquire and to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto, in addition to any provided for by the Act of March 24, 1934, as he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States under the Philippine Independence Act was enlarged by the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944, so as to include not only naval reservations and fueling stations but other military bases in the Philippines.

If bases may be validly granted to the United States under the Constitution, there is no plausible reason while the lesser attribute of the jurisdiction cannot be waived. From another point of view, waiver of jurisdiction may well be considered as included within the terms "necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto," appearing in the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944.

Jurisdiction being validly waived in favor of the United States under the Agreement in question, it follows that petitioner's contention regarding alleged denial of due process and equal protection of the law becomes unfounded.

The petition is therefore hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.