Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor

Facts:

Petitioner corporation and respondent labor union entered into a three year CBA. During the freedom period the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) questioned the majority status of Private respondent through a petition for certification election. The election conducted on February 27, 1992 was won by private respondent. On March 19, 1992, private respondent was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner's rank-and-file employees. Negotiations collapsed between the parties and private-respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. The NCMB tried but failed to settle the parties' controversy.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and resolved through an Order. The company argued that supervisors are ineligible for membership in a labor organization of rank and file as well as the exclusion of some employees on the ground of lack of community in interest and divergence in functions, mode of compensation, and working conditions. The Union demands that the CBA should be fully retroactive. Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the Order. Public respondent affirmed her findings.

Issue:

Did the Hon. Sec. of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in: 1) not excluding certain positions from the bargaining agreement unit; and 2) in making the CBA effective retroactively

Held:

What governs the determination of the nature of employment is not the employee's title, but his job description. If the nature of the employee's job does not fall under the definition of "managerial" or "supervisory" in the Labor Code, he is eligible to be a member of the rank-and-file bargaining unit.

In the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, 189 SCRA 179 (1991), the Court reiterated the rule that although a CBA has expired, it continues to have legal effects as between the parties until a new CBA has been entered into. It is the duty of both parties to the to keep the status quo, and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Applied to the case at bench, the legal effects of the immediate past CBA between petitioner and private respondent terminated, and the effectivity of the new CBA began, only on March 4, 1993 when public respondent resolved their dispute.