Mina v. Pascual

Facts:

Francisco Fontanilla and Andres Fontanilla were brothers. Francisco Fontanilla acquired during his lifetime, on March 12, 1874, a lot in the center of the town of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, the property having been awarded to him through its purchase at a public auction held by the alcalde mayor of that province. The lot has a frontage of 120 meters and a depth of 15.

Andres Fontanilla, with the consent of his brother Francisco, erected a warehouse on a part of the said lot, embracing 14 meters of its frontage by 11 meters of its depth.

Francisco Fontanilla, the former owner of the lot, being dead, the herein plaintiffs, Alejandro Mina, et al., were recognized without discussion as his heirs.

Andres Fontanilla, the former owner of the warehouse, also having died, the children of Ruperta Pascual were recognized likes without discussion, though it is not said how, and consequently are entitled to the said building, or rather, as Ruperta Pascual herself stated, to only six-sevenths of one-half of it, the other half belonging, as it appears, to the plaintiffs themselves, and the remaining one-seventh of the first one-half to the children of one of the plaintiffs, Elena de Villanueva. The fact is that the plaintiffs and the defendants are virtually, to all appearance, the owners of the warehouse; while the plaintiffs are undoubtedly, the owners of the part of the lot occupied by that building, as well as of the remainder thereof.

This was the state of affairs, when, on May 6, 1909, Ruperta Pascual, as the guardian of her minor children, the herein defendants, petitioned the Curt of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for authorization to sell "the six-sevenths of the one-half of the warehouse, of 14 by 11 meters, together with its lot."

The plaintiffs requested the court to decide the question of the ownership of the lot before it pass upon the petition for the sale of the warehouse. But the court before determining the matter of the ownership of the lot occupied by the warehouse, ordered the sale of this building, saying:

While the trial continues with respect to the ownership of the lot, the court orders the sale at public auction of the said warehouse and of the lot on which it is built, with the present boundaries of the land and condition of the building, at a price of not less than P2,890 Philippine currency. . .

The warehouse, together with the lot on which it stands, was sold to Cu Joco.

The plaintiffs insisted upon a decision of the question of the ownership of the lot, and the court decided it by holding that this land belonged to the owner of the warehouse which had been built thereon thirty years before.

The plaintiffs appealed and this court reversed the judgment of the lower court and held that the appellants were the owners of the lot in question.

A writ of execution issued and the plaintiffs were given possession of the lot; but soon thereafter the trial court annulled this possession for the reason that it affected Cu Joco, who had not been a party to the suit in which that writ was served.

It was then that the plaintiffs commenced the present action for the purpose of having the sale of the said lot declared null and void and of no force and effect.

RTC held that there were no grounds for the annulment of sale.

Issue:

 Whether or not there should be an action for recovery against Cu Joco to compel him, once the sale has been annulled, to deliver the lot to its lawful owners, the plaintiffs.

Held:

The SC found that:

1. That it is a fact admitted by the litigating parties, both in this and in the previous suit, that Andres Fontanilla, the defendants' predecessor in interest, erected the warehouse on the lot, some thirty years ago, with the explicit consent of his brother Francisco Fontanilla, the plaintiff's predecessor in interest.

2. That it also appears to be an admitted fact that the plaintiffs and the defendants are the coowners of the warehouse.

3. That it is a fact explicitly admitted in the agreement, that neither Andres Fontanilla nor his successors paid any consideration or price whatever for the use of the lot occupied by the said building; whence it is, perhaps, that both parties have denominated that use a commodatum.

The defendants do not hold lawful possession of the lot in question.

Contracts are not to be interpreted in conformity with the name that the parties thereto agree to give them, but must be construed, duly considering their constitutive elements, as they are defined and denominated by law.

By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to the other, either anything not perishable, in order that the latter may use it during the certain period and return it to the former, in which case it is called commodatum . . . (art. 1740, Civil Code).

It is, therefore, an essential feature of the commodatum that the use of the thing belonging to another shall for a certain period. Francisco Fontanilla did not fix any definite period or time during which Andres Fontanilla could have the use of the lot whereon the latter was to erect a stone warehouse of considerable value, and so it is that for the past thirty years of the lot has been used by both Andres and his successors in interest. The present contention of the plaintiffs that Cu Joco, now in possession of the lot, should pay rent for it at the rate of P5 a month, would destroy the theory of the commodatum sustained by them, since, according to the second paragraph of the aforecited article 1740, "commodatum is essentially gratuitous," and, if what the plaintiffs themselves aver on page 7 of their brief is to be believed, it never entered Francisco's mind to limit the period during which his brother Andres was to have the use of the lot, because he expected that the warehouse would eventually fall into the hands of his son, Fructuoso Fontanilla, called the adopted son of Andres, which did not come to pass for the reason that Fructuoso died before his uncle Andres. With that expectation in view, it appears more likely that Francisco intended to allow his brother Andres a surface right; but this right supposes the payment of an annual rent, and Andres had the gratuitous use of the lot.

Hence, as the facts aforestated only show that a building was erected on another's ground, the question should be decided in accordance with the statutes that, thirty years ago, governed accessions to real estate, and which were Laws 41 and 42, title 28, of the third Partida, nearly identical with the provisions of articles 361 and 362 of the Civil Code. So, then, pursuant to article 361, the owner of the land on which a building is erected in good faith has a right to appropriate such edifice to himself, after payment of the indemnity prescribed in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the builder to pay him the value of the land. Such, and no other, is the right to which the plaintiff are entitled.

For the foregoing reasons, it is only necessary to annul the sale of the said lot which was made by Ruperta Pascual, in representation of her minor children, to Cu Joco, and to maintain the latter in the use of the lot until the plaintiffs shall choose one or the other of the two rights granted them by article 361 of the Civil Code.