Facts:
Petitioner Yong Chan Kim was employed as a
Researcher at the Aquaculture Department of the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) with head
station at Tigbauan, Iloilo. He conducted prawn surveys which required him to travel to various selected provinces in the
country where there are potentials for
prawn culture. Petitioner was issued
Travel Order No. 2222 which covered his travels to different places in Luzon
from 16 June to 21 July 1982, a period of 35 days. Under this travel order, he received P6,438.00 as cash
advance to defray his travel expenses.
Petitioner was issued another travel order,
T.O. 2268, requiring him to travel from the Head Station to Roxas City from 30
June to 4 July 1982, a period of 5 days/ He received a cash advance of P495.00.
Petitioner presented both travel orders for
liquidation, submitting Travel Expense Reports to the Accounting Section. When the
Travel Expense Reports were audited, it was discovered that there was an
overlap of 4 days in the 2 travel orders for which petitioner collected per
diems twice. In sum, the total amount in the form of per diems and allowances
charged and collected by petitioner under Travel Order No. 2222, when he did
not actually and physically travel as represented by his liquidation papers,
was P1,230.00.
Petitioner denied the alleged anomaly,
claiming that he made make-up trips to compensate for the trips he failed to
undertake under T.O. 2222 because he was recalled to the head office and given
another assignment.
2 complaints of Estafa were filed against
him. In the first case, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt while the
latter was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Petitioner appealed but the RTC affirmed the
decision of MTC.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the
Regional Trial Court which ordered the elevation of the records of the case to
the IAC.
Petitioner filed with the appellate court a
petition for review. CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of
time. MR was denied for lack of merit.
Alonzo v. Villamor, et al.: The Court can
overlook the wrong pleading filed, if strict compliance with the rules would
mean sacrificing justice to technicality. The imminence of a person being
deprived unjustly of his liberty due to procedural lapse of counsel is a strong
and compelling reason to warrant suspension of the Rules. Hence, we shall
consider the petition for review filed in the Court of Appeals as a Supplement
to the Notice of Appeal. As the Court declared in a recent decision, '. . .
there is nothing sacred about the procedure of pleadings. This Court may go beyond
the pleadings when the interest of justice so warrants. It has the prerogative
to suspend its rules for the same purpose. . . Technicality, when it deserts
its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.
Conscience cannot rest in allowing a man to
go straight to jail, closing the door to his every entreaty for a full
opportunity to be heard, even as he has made a prima facie showing of a meritorious
cause, simply because he had chosen an appeal route, to be sure, recognized by
law but made inapplicable to his case, under altered rules of procedure. While
the Court of Appeals can not be faulted and, in fact, it has to be lauded for
correctly applying the rules of procedure in appeals to the Court of Appeals
from decisions of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, yet, this Court, as the ultimate bulwark of human rights and
individual liberty, will not allow substantial justice to be sacrificed at the
altar of procedural rigor.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of MTC and RTC are supported by the facts and evidence or contrary to law and that the courts a quo have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Whether or not the decision of MTC and RTC are supported by the facts and evidence or contrary to law and that the courts a quo have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes.
In order that a person can be convicted under
Estafa, it must be proven that he had the obligation to deliver or return the
same money, good or personal property that he had received. The petitioner had
no obligation to return the same money which he had received.
Liquidation simply means the settling of an
indebtedness. An employee, such as herein petitioner, who liquidates a cash
advance is in fact paying back his debt in the form of a loan of money advanced
to him by his employer, as per diems and allowances. Similarly, as stated in the
assailed decision of the lower court, "if the amount of the cash advance
he received is less than the amount he spent for actual travel . . . he has the
right to demand reimbursement from his employer the amount he spent coming from
his personal funds. In other words, the money advanced by either party is
actually a loan to the other. Hence, petitioner was under no legal obligation
to return the same cash or money, i.e., the bills or coins, which he received
from the private respondent.
Since ownership of the money (cash advance)
was transferred to petitioner, no fiduciary relationship was created. Absent
this fiduciary relationship between petitioner and private respondent, which is
an essential element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation or conversion,
petitioner could not have committed estafa.
Additionally, it has been the policy of
private respondent that all cash advances not liquidated are to be deducted
correspondingly from the salary of the employee concerned. The evidence shows
that the corresponding salary deduction was made in the case of petitioner
vis-a-vis the cash advance in question.
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