United BF Homeowners Associations, Inc. v. Barangay Chairman and Sangguniang Barangay of BF Homes Parañaque

Facts:

In 1991, then Parañaque Congressman Freddie Webb caused the construction of a multi-purpose hall on an old basketball court in BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision. The old basketball court was one of the original facilities built by the developer, BF Homes Inc. (BFHI). The funds for the construction of the building were taken from Congressman Webb's Countrywide Development Fund. The controversy arose when both petitioner and respondents claimed authority over the administration of the hall.

Petitioner protested when respondents installed a fence around the edifice. Petitioner also censured the latter for refusing to seek its prior endorsement before issuing barangay clearances to operate or conduct businesses inside the subdivision.

According to petitioner, since the hall was erected on an "open space" in the subdivision, it remained the private property of the subdivision's developer. As BFHI's representative, it was charged with the administration of the property. It also pointed out that, under Municipal Resolution No. 88-123 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-084 passed by the Municipal (now City) Council of Parañaque, its endorsement was necessary before barangay clearances could be given to applicants for business licenses within the subdivision.

Respondents, on the other hand, invoked RA 7160 or the LGC as the source of their authority to administer the hall and to issue barangay clearances even without petitioner's prior endorsement.

Issues:

(1) whether PD 957,11 as amended by PD 1216, had been repealed by RA 7160; (2) whether petitioner had the exclusive right to administer the subject multi-purpose hall and (3) whether petitioner's (prior) endorsement was necessary before a barangay business clearance could be issued by respondents.

Held:

The first issue was not raised in the proceedings in the lower court. As a rule, an issue raised for the very first time on appeal should not be allowed. Petitioner, however, contends that the resolution of the first issue is necessary to resolve the case. We do not see the point of petitioner.

Except for providing the definition of "open space," petitioner fails to cite any clear-cut basis why the Court should disregard the above rule. Neither does it provide a cogent explanation why this Court should rule that RA 7160 supposedly repealed PD 957, as amended by PD 1216. At any rate, no irreconcilable inconsistency appears in both laws that will force us to uphold one and strike down the other.

No doubt, BFHI is the owner of the "open space." However, it does not necessarily follow that petitioner should be charged with the administration of the hall. Acts of administration, as opposed to acts of ownership, pertain solely to management or superintendence. They do not necessarily pivot on ownership.

Be that as it may, petitioner's right as owner's representative to use and enjoy the "open space" is not absolute but may be subjected to reasonable regulation by the government. In this regard, RA 7160, Section 391(a)(7) is pertinent:

SECTION 391. Powers, Duties, and Functions.─

(a) The sangguniang barangay, as the legislative body of the barangay, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(7) regulate the use of the multi-purpose halls, multi-purpose pavements, grain or copra dryers, patios and other post harvest facilities, barangay waterworks, barangay markets, parking area or other similar facilities constructed with government funds within the jurisdiction of the barangay and charge reasonable fees for the use thereof. (emphases ours)

Based on the foregoing, it is respondents, not petitioner, who enjoy the authority to administer the hall. Although the building was erected on an "open space" owned by BFHI, there is no doubt that the cost of its construction was sourced from government funds. Thus, the hall falls within the ambit of respondents' jurisdiction. The law is clear and unambiguous, hence, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.

Furthermore, while it may be gainsaid that PD 957, is the relevant law governing subdivisions and that, under said law, the maintenance of the "open space" pertains to the residents thereof, the Court nevertheless still cannot award the administration of the hall to petitioner. As the records indicate, the case does not involve merely the maintenance of the "open space" but of the hall itself that was built with government funds.

Well-recognized is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts distinguish ― ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemus.

A close reading of Section 391(a)(7) shows that the legislature did not intend to make such a distinction. Therefore, we cannot make any valid inference therefrom that the hall is different from the other multi-purpose halls referred to in the provision. The Court cannot read into the law something which was not intended by the legislature lest it be accused of encroaching on the latter's law-making power.

This Court wishes to emphasize that the authority of respondents over the hall is purely administrative in nature. They cannot exercise any act of ownership over it, especially its surrounding areas. Thus, respondents erred in constructing a fence on the areas adjoining the hall as these are already part of the "open space" and which are therefore no longer under their jurisdiction or authority. Moreover, since respondents have shown no proof that the fence serves any purpose ancillary to their right to regulate the hall, we are constrained to strike down respondents' act as ultra vires or in excess of their mandated authority under RA 7160.

On the issue of whether petitioner's endorsement is necessary before the issuance of a barangay clearance, we rule in favor of petitioner. Under the local legislations passed by the then Municipal Council of Parañaque, Municipal (City) Resolution No. 88-1222 and Municipal (City) Ordinance No. 97-08,23 respondents must first obtain petitioner's prior endorsement. These issuances are in effect to this date. Respondents themselves did not present any evidence to the contrary, hence, their acquiescence thereto may be safely implied.

Furthermore, the required endorsement of petitioner cannot be negated by respondents' argument that RA 7160, Section 152(c)24 vests on them the exclusive right to issue said clearances. Respondents' authority to issue barangay clearances under Section 152(c) is clear. But that is not the point.

The court found no inconsistency between Section 152(c) of RA 7160 and the local legislations passed by the then Municipal Council of Parañaque. In fact, they only made more evident the authority split between petitioner and respondents to, on one hand, endorse applications for and, on the other, issue barangay clearances within the subdivision.

Respondents are hereby directed to (1) seek petitioner's endorsement before issuing barangay clearances to applicants of business permits and (2) desist from acts of ownership over the "open space" on which the multi-purpose hall stands.