Facts:
Respondent Feed the Children Philippines, Inc. (FTCP) is a non-stock, non-profit, and non-government organization duly incorporated under the
Philippine laws in 1989. Respondents Dr. Virginia Lao, Hercules Paradiang and
Benjamin Escobia were members of the FTCP Board of Trustees (Board) and
Executive Committee (Execom) of FTCP.
Petitioner Rosalinda Paredes was FTCP's National Director. Her
functions and duties include project management, fund accessing, income
generation, financial management, and administration of the organization. She
also signed all the FTCP checks and approved all requisitions and disbursements
of FTCP funds. As per FTCP's By-laws, it was also her
duty to execute all resolutions and/or decisions of the Board.
Petitioner was first hired by FTCP in 1999 as Country Director.
Her contract was renewed several times until her last contract for the period
from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2007. Her initial salary was US$1000.00
and then later, she was paid 70,000.00 aside from other benefits and
allowances.
On August 12, 2005, forty-two (42) FTCP employees signed a
petition letter addressed to the Board expressing their complaints against
alleged detestable practices of petitioner, to wit: seeking exemption from
policies which she herself had approved; withholding organization funds despite
approval of its release; procuring health insurance for herself without paying
her share of the premium; and receiving additional fees contrary to the terms
of her contract.
The next day, August 13, 2005, the staff of FTCP called Lao to a meeting to submit their petition. The group was edgy and demanded for outright solution. However, the three Board members told them that they should follow a process.
Petitioner learned from Atty. Chatto that Program Manager
Primitivo Fostanes and his co-employees prepared a petition questioning her leadership
and management of FTCP. She filed an administrative complaint against Fostanes
on August 24, 2005, but the same was not acted upon.
When the Board convened for a meeting on August 28, 2005, petitioner was not allowed to participate. She was only allowed to join the meeting after three hours. As ex officio member of the Board and as head of the secretariat, she was always present in every meeting to discuss her reports, programs and proposals.
The Board resolved to suspend petitioner because of her
indifferent attitude and unjustified refusal to submit to an audit. Before it
could be implemented, respondent FTCP received her resignation letter.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that
she was forced to resign, thus, was constructively dismissed. LA ruled in favor
of the respondents.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed
and set aside the decision of the LA and ruled in her favor.
Issues:
I. W/N the CA contravenes the law and jurisprudence when it
granted the petition for certiorari that raised questions factual in nature and
when it sweepingly applied the ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes to justify
its act of delving into the findings of the NLRC which were outside the scope
of extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
II. W/N the CA grossly contradicts the law and jurisprudence on
constructive dismissal and ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome of the
case when it ruled that petitioner voluntarily resigned and was not
constructively dismissed.
III. W/N the CA effectively reverses the law and jurisprudence on
damages and recognized money claims in labor cases when it condemned petitioner
to pay respondents' claims for damages that were not duly proven by the latter
and that clearly did not arise from an employer-employee relationship.
IV. W/N the CA violates the Constitution, the law and the
prevailing jurisprudence when it resolved the lingering doubts that remain in
the present case, as those arising from evidence and from interpretation of
agreements and writings, against labor.
Held:
Partly meritorious.
Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation
of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials' findings
rest. As such, the findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally
accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and
deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence.
After judicious review on the records of the case, this Court
deems it proper to disregard the findings of fact of the NLRC. This Court finds
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled for the
petitioner without substantial evidence to support its findings of facts and
conclusion.
Since petitioner admittedly resigned, it is incumbent upon her to
prove that her resignation was involuntary and that it was actually a case of
constructive dismissal with clear, positive and convincing evidence.
Case law holds that constructive dismissal occurs when there is
cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay
or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee. The test is whether a reasonable
person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his
position under the circumstances.
In this case, petitioner cannot be deemed constructively
dismissed. She failed to present clear and positive evidence that respondent
FTCP, through its Board of Trustees, committed acts of discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain towards her which rendered her continued employment
unbearable or forced her to terminate her employment from the respondent. As
settled, bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the
evidence on record, cannot be given credence.
There was no urgency for petitioner to submit her resignation
letter. In fact, the day before it was given, she and other management staff
requested for a dialogue with the Board to address the issue regarding the
management and financial audit. It is, therefore, improbable that her continued
employment is rendered impossible or unreasonable.
We are not persuaded that her exclusion to the meeting constituted
discrimination or harassment. A careful perusal of the minutes would reveal
that the Board convened to deliberate on the solution to the apparent conflict
between petitioner and the staff since they have insufficient grievance
mechanism for issues involving top management. She could not fault the Board to
not include her in that particular meeting since she was a party involved and
to avoid possible influence that she could have exerted.
We held that the act of the employer moving the effectivity of the
resignation is not an act of harassment. The 30-day notice requirement for an
employee’s resignation is actually for the benefit of the employer who has the
discretion to waive such period. Its purpose is to afford the employer enough
time to hire another employee if needed and to see to it that there is proper
turn-over of the tasks which the resigning employee may be handling.
Such rule requiring an employee to stay or complete the 30-day
period prior to the effectivity of his resignation becomes discretionary on the
part of management as an employee who intends to resign may be allowed a
shorter period before his resignation becomes effective.
Applying the rule of noscitur a sociis in clarifying the scope of
Article 217, it is evident that paragraphs 1 to 5 refer to cases or disputes
arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. In
other words, the money claims within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
labor arbiters are those which have some reasonable causal connection with the
employer-employee relationship.
This claim is distinguished from cases of actions for damages
where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of
action proceeds from a different source of obligation. Thus, the regular courts
have jurisdiction where the damages claimed for were based on: tort, malicious
prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a
debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in the enforcement of a
prior employment contract.
It is settled that the law serves to equalize the unequal. The
labor force is a special class that is constitutionally protected because of
the inequality between capital and labor. This constitutional protection
presupposes that the labor force is weak. However, the level of protection to
labor should vary from case to case; otherwise, the state might appear to be
too paternalistic in affording protection to labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari,
dated October 23, 2008, of petitioner Rosalinda G. Paredes is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the
ruling of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated March 25, 2008, that
petitioner was not constructively dismissed, is hereby AFFIRMED. However, the awards of P34,438.37 and Pl09,208.36 for
the unpaid debt of petitioner and reimbursement of the FTCP Provident Fund,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.
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