Gutierrez Hermanos v. CA

Facts:

Gutierrez Hermanos filed 7 applications with the CFI of Masbate for the registration under LRA, Act No. 496, of its alleged titles over 7 parcels of land with an area of around 9,490 hectares in Burias Masbate. They prayed that if Act No. 496 was not applicable in full to each of the seven petitions for land registration, the benefits of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Law, be extended to the applicant.

The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and hundreds of private individuals opposed the 7 petitions for registration. These 7 cases were consolidated after the agreement of the parties.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner may register certain parcels of land or whether it consists of inalienable timberlands and consequently, non-registerable?

Held:

Dismissed.

As early as 1913, the Supreme Court stated in Malolos v. Director of Lands (25 Phil. 548):

One of the primary and fundamental purposes of the registration of land under the Torrens system is to secure to the owner an absolute, indefeasible title, free from all encumbrances and claims whatsoever, except those mentioned in the certificate of title, and, so far as it is possible, to make the certificate issued to the owner by the court, absolute proof of such title. In order, however, that the petitioner for registration of his land under the Torrens system shall be permitted to have the same registered and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title finally issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to have registered...

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The denial of a petition for registration simply indicates that he has not furnished that kind of proof showing an absolute title in fee simple which is required under the Torrens system. It is the duty of the courts, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as it is possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to have registered.

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The Supreme Court, through then Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, stated in Santiago v. Delos Santos (61 SCRA, 151-152):

The appealed order of dismissal is thus impressed with merit. It has likewise in its favor the soundest policy considerations, based no less on one of the prime objectives of the fundamental law. Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right over the same as dominus. Its disposition is justified only when shown that its utilization promotes the public welfare. Especially so in case of doubt, considering that our forest resources have been unduly depleted, courts should not lightly accept claims that a parcel of land no longer can be classified as forestal. That is certainly one mode of assuring the realization of the national patrimony being held in trust for future generations. There is thus fealty to the ideal of conservation.

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The social justice provision, Section 6, Article Two of the Constitution, provides that the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property. When the claims to private property collide with a strong showing that the land sought to be titled may be part of the patrimony of the nation, such claims require the closest examination and scrutiny. The properties sought to be titled are almost 10,000 hectares in area and would create a landed estate. In the words of the Supreme Court, the registrable rights must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof.

Not only is there a vigorous assertion that the lands sought to be registered belong to the public domain and that the claims of title are insufficient and nugatory, but the lands subject of these appeals have been taken over by other private individuals — hundreds of oppositors according to the lower Court — who have lived on extensive portions of the disputed lots since the Japanese occupation.

The Land Registration Act, Act 496 requires the presentation of muniments of title for registration under the regular provisions of said law. The applicant, which alleged ownership in fee simple since Spanish times, could have presented old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase. The applicant could have presented a titulo posesorio or possessory information title, which is not a title in fee simple but is nonetheless prima facie evidence of possession under concept of ownership from the date of the title and for the required period under the law.