Sps. Vintola v. Insular Bank of Asia and America

Doctrine: A trust receipt is considered as a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral of the merchandise imported or purchased.

Facts: Spouses Tirso and Loreta Vintola, doing business under the name and style "Dax Kin International," engaged in the manufacture of raw sea shells into finished products, applied for and were granted a domestic letter of credit by the IBAA, Cebu City in the amount of P40,000.00. The Letter of Credit authorized the bank to negotiate for their account drafts drawn by their supplier, one Stalin Tan, on Dax Kin International for the purchase of puka and olive seashells. In consideration thereof, the VINTOLAS, jointly and severally, agreed to pay the bank "at maturity, in Philippine currency, the equivalent, of the aforementioned amount or such portion thereof as may be drawn or paid, upon the faith of the said credit together with the usual charges.”

On the same day, having received from Stalin Tan the puka and olive shells worth P40,000.00, the VINTOLAS executed a Trust Receipt agreement with IBAA, Cebu City. Under that Agreement, the VINTOLAS agreed to hold the goods in trust for IBAA as the "latter's property with liberty to sell the same for its account, " and "in case of sale" to turn over the proceeds as soon as received to IBAA the due date indicated in the document.

Having defaulted on their obligation, IBAA demanded payment from the VINTOLAS. The VINTOLAS, who were unable to dispose of the shells, responded by offering to return the goods. IBAA refused to accept the merchandise, and due to the continued refusal of the VINTOLAS to make good their undertaking, IBAA charged them with Estafa for having misappropriated, misapplied and converted for their own personal use and benefit the aforesaid goods. During the trial of the criminal case the VINTOLAS turned over the seashells to the custody of the Trial Court. CFI Cebu acquitted the VINTOLAS of the crime charged, after finding that the element of misappropriation or conversion was inexistent. 

IBAA commenced the present civil action to recover the value of the goods before RTC Cebu.

Holding that the complaint was barred by the judgment of acquittal in the criminal case, said Court dismissed the complaint. However, on IBAA's motion, the Court granted reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the Vintolas should be absolved from liabilities by settlement. No.

Held: A letter of credit-trust receipt arrangement is endowed with its own distinctive features and characteristics. Under that set-up, a bank extends a loan covered by the Letter of Credit, with the trust receipt as a security for the loan. In other words, the transaction involves a loan feature represented by the letter of credit, and a security feature which is in the covering trust receipt.

A trust receipt is a security agreement, pursuant to which a bank acquires a "security interest" in the goods. "It secures an indebtedness and there can be no such thing as security interest that secures no obligation.”

As elucidated in Samo vs. People "a trust receipt is considered as a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral of the merchandise imported or purchased.”

Contrary to the allegation of the VINTOLAS, IBAA did not become the real owner of the goods. It was merely the holder of a security title for the advances it had made to the VINTOLAS The goods the VINTOLAS had purchased through IBAA financing remain their own property and they hold it at their own risk. The trust receipt arrangement did not convert the IBAA into an investor; the latter remained a lender and creditor.

Since the IBAA is not the factual owner of the goods, the VINTOLAS cannot justifiably claim that because they have surrendered the goods to IBAA and subsequently deposited them in the custody of the court, they are absolutely relieved of their obligation to pay their loan because of their inability to dispose of the goods. The fact that they were unable to sell the seashells in question does not affect IBAA's right to recover the advances it had made under the Letter of Credit.

The acquittal of the VINTOLAS in the Estafa case is no bar to the institution of a civil action for collection. It is inaccurate for the VINTOLAS to claim that the judgment in the estafa case had declared that the facts from which the civil action might arise, did not exist, for, it will be recalled that the decision of acquittal expressly declared that "the remedy of the Bank is civil and not criminal in nature." This amounts to a reservation of the civil action in IBAA's favor, for the Court would not have dwelt on a civil liability that it had intended to extinguish by the same decision. The VINTOLAS are liable ex contractu for breach of the Letter of Credit — Trust Receipt, whether they did or they did not "misappropriate, misapply or convert" the merchandise as charged in the criminal case. Their civil liability does not arise ex delicto, the action for the recovery of which would have been deemed instituted with the criminal-action (unless waived or reserved) and where acquittal based on a judicial declaration that the criminal acts charged do not exist would have extinguished the civil action. Rather, the civil suit instituted by IBAA is based ex contractu and as such is distinct and independent from any criminal proceedings and may proceed regardless of the result of the latter. Under the situational circumstances of the parties, they are governed by Article 31 of the Civil Code, explicitly providing:

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. v. Cruz

Doctrine: When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Facts: Respondent Edgar Hernandez was driving an Isuzu Passenger Jitney (jeepney) that he owns along Angeles-Magalang Road, Barangay San Francisco, Magalang, Pampanga, on January 9, 1998, around 7:50 p.m. Meanwhile,. a Daewoo passenger bus (RCJ Bus Lines) owned by petitioner Travel and Tours Advisers, Inc. and driven by Edgar Calaycay travelled in the same direction as that of respondent Edgar Hernandez vehicle. Thereafter, the bus bumped the rear portion of the jeepney causing it to ram into an acacia tree which resulted in the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. and the serious physical injuries of Virginia Muñoz.

Thus, respondents Edgar Hernandez, Virginia Muñoz and Alberto Cruz, Sr., father of the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr., filed a complaint for damages, before the RTC claiming that the collision was due to the reckless, negligent and imprudent manner by which Edgar Calaycay was driving the bus, in complete disregard to existing traffic laws, rules and regulations.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents.

Petitioner filed its appeal with the CA, which affirmed with modifications the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether Hernandez has contributory negligence

Held: Court finds no merit to grant the petition. The issues presented are all factual in nature and do not fall under any of the exceptions upon which this Court may review.

Nevertheless, a review of the issues presented in this petition would still lead to the finding that petitioner is still liable for the damages awarded to the respondents but with certain modifications.

The RTC and the CA are one in finding that both vehicles were not in their authorized routes at the time of the incident. The conductor of petitioner's bus admitted on cross-examination that the driver of the bus veered off from its usual route to avoid heavy traffic. The CA thus observed:

First. As pointed out in the assailed Decision, both vehicles were not in their authorized routes at the time of the mishap. FRANCISCO TEJADA, the conductor of defendant-appellant's bus, admitted on cross-examination that the driver of the bus passed through Magalang Road instead of Sta. Ines, which was the usual route. Regardless of the reason, however, the irrefutable fact remains that defendant-appellant's bus likewise veered from its usual route. It is indisputable that the jeepney was traversing a road out of its allowed route.

From the factual findings of both the RTC and the CA based on the evidence presented, the proximate cause of the collision is the negligence of the driver of petitioner's bus. The jeepney was bumped at the left rear portion. Thus, this Court's past ruling, that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, can be applied. The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Thus, as found by the CA:

Second. The evidence on record preponderantly shows that it was the negligence of defendant-appellant's driver, EDGAR CALAYCAY, that was the proximate cause of the collision.

Even without considering the photographs showing the damage to the jeepney, it cannot be denied that the said vehicle was bumped in its left rear portion by defendant-appellant's bus. It has been held that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence." The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. x x x (F)rom the evidence presented, it was established that it was the driver of the RCJ Line Bus which was negligent and recklessly driving the bus of the defendant corporation.

The fact that at the time of the vehicular accident, the jeepney was in violation of its allowed route as found by the RTC and the CA, hence, the owner and driver of the jeepney likewise, are guilty of negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The petitioner and its driver, therefore, are not solely liable for the damages caused to the victims. The petitioner must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. It is, therefore, proper to mitigate the liability of the petitioner and its driver. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant's liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.

In the same manner, petitioner is also partly responsible for the injuries sustained by respondent Virginia Muñoz hence, of the P16,744.00 actual damages and P30,000.00 moral damages awarded by the CA, petitioner is liable for half of those amounts. Anent respondent Edgar Hernandez, due to his contributory negligence, he is only entitled to receive half the amount (P40,200.00) awarded by the CA as actual damages which is P20,100.00.

Taiwan Kolin Co., Ltd., v. Kolin Electronics Co., Inc. (2015)

Doctrines: 

• Emphasis should be on the similarity of the products involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of their properties or characteristics. The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods would not, without more, prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by others on unrelated articles of a different kind.
• In trademark cases, particularly in ascertaining whether one trademark is confusingly similar to another, no rigid set rules can plausible be formulated. Each case must be decided on its merits, with due regard to the goods or services involved, the usual purchaser’s character and attitude, among others. In such cases, even more than in any other litigation, precedent must be studied in the light of the facts of a particular case.

Facts: Taiwan Kolin filed with the IPO, then Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology Transfer, a trademark application for the use of "KOLIN" on a combination of goods, including colored televisions, refrigerators, window-type and split-type air conditioners, electric fans and water dispensers. Said goods allegedly fall under Classes 9, 11, and 21 of the Nice Classification (NCL). The would eventually be considered abandoned for Taiwan Kolin’s failure to respond to IPO’s Paper No. 5 requiring it to elect one class of good for its coverage. However, the same application was subsequently revived through another application, with petitioner electing Class 9. The application would in time be duly published.

Kolin Electronics opposed petitioner’s revived application. The mark Taiwan Kolin seeks to register is identical, if not confusingly similar, with its "KOLIN" mark, covering the following products under Class 9 of the NCL: automatic voltage regulator, converter, recharger, stereo booster, AC-DC regulated power supply, step-down transformer, and PA amplified AC-DC.

To digress a bit, Kolin Electronics’ "KOLIN" registration was, as it turns out, the subject of a prior legal dispute between the parties before the IPO. In the said case, Kolin Electronics’ own application was opposed by Taiwan Kolin, being, as Taiwan Kolin claimed, the prior registrant and user of the "KOLIN" trademark, having registered the same in Taipei, Taiwan on December 1, 1988. The Bureau of Legal Affairs of the IPO (BLA-IPO), however, did not accord priority right to Taiwan Kolin’s Taipei registration absent evidence to prove that it has already used the said mark in the Philippines as early as 1988. On appeal, the IPO Director General affirmed the BLA-IPO’s Decision. Taiwan Kolin elevated the case to the CA, but without injunctive relief, Kolin Electronics was able to register the "KOLIN" trademark for its products. CA affirmed the Decision.

In answer to respondent’s opposition, petitioner argued that it should be accorded the benefits of a foreign-registered mark under Secs. 3 and 131.1 of Republic Act No. 8293 (IP Code); that it has already registered the "KOLIN" mark in the People’s Republic of China, Malaysia and Vietnam, all of which are parties to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); and that benefits accorded to a well-known mark should be accorded to petitioner.

BLA-IPO denied petitioner’s application. Citing Sec. 123(d) of the IP Code, the BLA-IPO held that a mark cannot be registered if it is identical with a registered mark belonging to a different proprietor in respect of the same or closely-related goods. The BLA-IPO also noted that there was proof of actual confusion in the form of consumers writing numerous e-mails to respondent asking for information, service, and complaints about petitioner’s products.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Thus, petitioner appealed the above Decision to the Office of the Director General of the IPO.

IPO Director reversed the Decision of the BLA-IPO. In so ruling, the IPO Director General ratiocinated that product classification alone cannot serve as the decisive factor in the resolution of whether or not the goods are related and that emphasis should be on the similarity of the products involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of their properties or characteristics.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the case to the CA. The appeal was granted. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to its trademark registration of "KOLIN" over its specific goods of television sets and DVD players.

Held: Identical marks may be registered for products from the same classification.

Mere uniformity in categorization, by itself, does not automatically preclude the registration of what appears to be an identical mark, if that be the case. In fact, this Court, in a long line of cases, has held that such circumstance does not necessarily result in any trademark infringement.

Verily, whether or not the products covered by the trademark sought to be registered by Taiwan Kolin, on the one hand, and those covered by the prior issued certificate of registration in favor of Kolin Electronics, on the other, fall under the same categories in the NCL is not the sole and decisive factor in determining a possible violation of Kolin Electronics’ intellectual property right should petitioner’s application be granted. It is hornbook doctrine, as held in the above-cited cases, that emphasis should be on the similarity of the products involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of their properties or characteristics. The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods would not, without more, prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by others on unrelated articles of a different kind. The CA erred in denying petitioner’s registration application.

The intertwined use, the same classification of the products as class 9 under the NICE Agreement, and the fact that they generally flow through the same channel of trade clearly establish that Taiwan Kolin’s television sets and DVD players are closely related to Kolin Electronics’ goods. As correctly pointed out by the BLA-IPO, allowing Taiwan Kolin’s registration would only confuse consumers as to the origin of the products they intend to purchase. Accordingly, protection should be afforded to Kolin Electronics, as the registered owner of the "KOLIN" trademark.

a. The products covered by petitioner’s application and respondent’s registration are unrelated

A certificate of trademark registration confers upon the trademark owner the exclusive right to sue those who have adopted a similar mark not only in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate, but also with those that are related thereto.

It was erroneous for respondent to assume over the CA to conclude that all electronic products are related and that the coverage of one electronic product necessarily precludes the registration of a similar mark over another. In this digital age wherein electronic products have not only diversified by leaps and bounds, and are geared towards interoperability, it is difficult to assert readily, as respondent simplistically did, that all devices that require plugging into sockets are necessarily related goods.

b. The ordinarily intelligent buyer is not likely to be confused

In trademark cases, particularly in ascertaining whether one trademark is confusingly similar to another, no rigid set rules can plausible be formulated. Each case must be decided on its merits, with due regard to the goods or services involved, the usual purchaser’s character and attitude, among others. In such cases, even more than in any other litigation, precedent must be studied in the light of the facts of a particular case. That is the reason why in trademark cases, jurisprudential precedents should be applied only to a case if they are specifically in point. For a clearer perspective and as matter of record, the following image on the left is the trademark applied for by petitioner, while the image juxtaposed to its right is the trademark registered by respondent:

The differing features between the two, though they may appear minimal, are sufficient to distinguish one brand from the other.

It cannot be stressed enough that the products involved in the case at bar are, generally speaking, various kinds of electronic products. These are not ordinary consumable household items, like catsup, soy sauce or soap which are of minimal cost. The products of the contending parties are relatively luxury items not easily considered affordable. Accordingly, the casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious and discriminating in and would prefer to mull over his purchase. Confusion and deception, then, is less likely.

All told, We are convinced that petitioner's trademark registration not only covers unrelated good, but is also incapable of deceiving the ordinary intelligent buyer. The ordinary purchaser must be thought of as having, and credited with, at least a modicum of intelligence to be able to see the differences between the two trademarks in question.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122565, dated April 30, 2013 and November 6, 2013, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Intellectual Property Office Director General in Inter Partes Case No. 14-2006-00096, dated November 23, 2011, is hereby REINSTATED.

Republic v. Cortez

Facts: A Petition for Mandamus was filed by NECU and NEWU with RTC QC praying that the NAPOCOR be ordered to release the COLA and AA allegedly withheld from them. NECU and NEWU pointed to this Court's pronouncements in De Jesus v. COA, Philippine Ports Authority Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 v. COA, and MWSS v. Bautista, et al. They believed that they were among the government employees whose COLA and AA were not factually integrated into their basic salary upon the implementation of RA No. 6758. The trial court granted their petition. 

OSG and then SBM Andaya separately filed Petitions for Certiorari with the SC. The Court granted the petitions. Respondents’ COLA and AA were already factually integrated into their basic salaries. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the Motion for Reconsideration should be granted.

Held: No. Those who were hired after the implementation of RA No. 6758, or after July 1, 1989, did not receive a lesser compensation package than those who were hired before July 1, 1989. To emphasize, respondents NECU's and NEWU's COLA and AA were integrated into their basic salary by virtue of Section 12 of RA No. 6758. Section 12 has never been ineffective or rendered unconstitutional. Thus, all allowances not covered by the exceptions to Section 12 are presumed to have been integrated into the basic standardized pay. The receipt of a transition allowance is not proof that only those who were hired before July 1, 1989 received their COLA and AA. As this Court explained in its February 7, 2017 Decision, the transition allowance was given only to comply with the non-diminution clause of the law. It was never meant as an additional compensation to the standardized pay.

Nazareno v. Maersk FIlipinas Crewing Inc., et al

Facts: Nazareno was hired by Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. (MCI) as Chief Officer for and in behalf of its foreign principal Elite Shipping A/S on board vessel M/V Artkis Hope for a period of 6 months.

The vessel was berthed at Port Belem, Brazil to load timber. While petitioner was checking the last bundle of timber to be loaded, he suddenly lost his balance and fell at a height of 2m. He landed on the timber and injured his right shoulder. Due to the pain he felt in his right shoulder, he was later examined at Philadelphia, U.S.A. and was considered not fit for work.  It was recommended that petitioner should be confined for thorough evaluation and further tests, such as MRI. Petitioner was also advised to see an Orthopedic Surgeon and/or a Neurologist. However, petitioner was not permitted to disembark as there was no one available to replace him. Petitioner was also brought at the Ulsan Hyundai Hospital at Ulsan, South Korea where he was treated and given medication for his “frozen right shoulder.” He was also advised to undergo physical therapy. Consequently, petitioner was declared unfit to work and was recommended to be signed off from duty. When petitioner was repatriated to Manila, he reported to MCI which referred him to MCM where he underwent PT program under Dr. Periquet 3 times a week. Dr. Campana issued a Medical Certificate stating that after after treatment and physical therapy, petitioner was fit for work. 

However, after almost 2 months of therapy, petitioner did not notice any improvement. He informed Dr. Periquet that when he was in Philadelphia, U.S.A., he was advised to consult a neurologist and undergo MRI. When Dr. Periquet ignored him, he consulted another doctor.  Petitioner underwent a series of treatment for his “frozen shoulder of the right arm” from Dr. Tan in his Chiropractic Clinic. Petitioner consulted Dr. Santiago, a Neurologist at MMC. Dr. Santiago concluded that petitioner will no longer be able to function as in his previous disease-free state and that his condition would hamper him from operating as chief officer of a ship. Petitioner was also examined by Dr. Vicaldo who diagnosed petitioner to be suffering from Parkinson’s disease and a frozen right shoulder (secondary), with an “Impediment Grade VII (41.8%). He concluded that petitioner is unfit to work as a seafarer.

Petitioner sought payment of his disability benefits and medical allowance from respondents, but was refused. He filed a complaint to the NLRC. The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed with modifications the decision of the LA, deleting the grant of sickness allowance. Respondents filed an MR but it was denied. Respondents filed before the CA which was granted. 

Issue: Whether the CA committed grave error in reversing and setting aside the decisions of both the LA a quo and the NLRC.

Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the CA relied on the provisions of Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC and the ruling of this Court in German Marine Agencies, Inc. v NLRC, in concluding that the disability of a seafarer can only be determined by a company-designated physician and not the seafarer’s own doctors.

The rule is that under Section 20-B (3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, it is mandatory for a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits. However, in submitting himself to examination by the company-designated physician, a claimant does not automatically bind himself to the medical report issued by the company-designated physician; neither are the labor tribunals and the courts bound by said medical report. Its inherent merit will be weighed and duly considered. Moreover, the claimant may dispute the medical report issued by the company-designated physician by seasonably consulting another physician. The medical report issued by said physician will also be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court based on its inherent merits.

National Transmission Corp. v. COA

Facts: Petitioner TransCo is a government instrumentality created under EPIRA Law, operating and managing the power transmission system that links power plants to electric distribution utilities nationwide. Its concession was awarded to the NGCP. 

Agulto was a regular employee of Petitioner received his separation benefits (P656,597.50) pursuant to the petitioner’s Early Separation Program. During post-audit, Supervising Auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance disallowing the amount of P22,965.81 from Agulto's separation benefits as said amount pertained to the period during which Agulto's employment status was still contractual. Petitioner appealed before the COA Director arguing that the payment of separation benefits to contractual employees was lawful as it was in accordance with the EPIRA Law, the Corporation Code, and the Board Resolutions of petitioner. COA Director partially granted the appeal  by exempting Agulto from liability since he received his separation benefits in good faith. COA Chairperson disapproved the decision of COA Director.

Issue: Whether COA-CP committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing a portion of Agulto’s separation benefits and in finding him and the members of petitioner TransCo's Board of Directors solidarily liable.

Held: In this case, since there was no proof that Agulto's appointment was duly approved or attested to by the CSC, the disallowance of the amount of P22,965.81 was valid and proper. Thus, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COA-CP is sustaining the disallowance.

The disallowed amount, however, need not be refunded by the members of petitioner TransCo's Board of Directors as well as by Agulto, following the ruling of the Court in National Transmission Corporation -

The Court, nevertheless, finds that TransCo and Miranda be excused from refunding the disallowed amount notwithstanding the propriety of the ND in question. In view of TransCo's reliance on Lopez, which the Court now abandons, the Court grants TransCo's petition pro hac vice and absolved it from any liability in refunding the disallowed amount.

On another note, even if the ND is to be upheld, Miranda should not be solidarily liable to refund the same. In Silang v. COA, the Court had ruled that passive recipients of the disallowed disbursements who acted in good faith, are absolved from refunding the same. x x x

Rosales v. New ANJH Enterprises

Facts: Respondent New ANJH Enterprises (New ANJH) is a sole proprietorship owned by respondent Noel Awayan. Petitioners are its former employees who worked as machine operators, drivers, helpers, lead and boiler men. 

Allegedly due to dwindling capital, Noel wrote the Director of DOLE Region IV-A regarding New ANJH's impending cessation of operations and the sale of its assets to respondent NH Oil Mill Corporation as well as the termination of 33 employees by reason thereof. Noel signed a Deed of Sale selling the equipment, machines, tools and/or other devices being used by New ANJH Enterprises to NH Oil. Noel met with the 33 affected employees to inform them of his plan and then later gave the employees uniformly-worded Notices informing them of the cessation of operations of New ANJH and the sale of its assets to a corporation. Noel also offered the employees, including petitioners, their separation pay. 

Respondents New ANJH and Noel filed before the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch a Letter Request for Intervention. Petitioners received their separation benefits and signed their respective Quitclaims and Release and check vouchers. LA Guan declared the “labor dispute” between New ANJH and petitioners as dismissed with prejudice on ground of settlement. 

Petitioners however filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that while New ANJH stopped its operations, it resumed its operations as NH Oil using the same machineries and with the same owners and management. ELA Santos found the petitioners had been illegally dismissed. NLRC denied respondents’ appeal. NLRC issued another decision reversing its earlier decision on the ground that it was barred by the Orders issued by LA Guan under the doctrine of res judicata. CA affirmed the NLRC Resolutions.

Issue: Whether the petitioners’ complaint for illegal dismissal was already barred by res judicata.

Held: No. Article 219 (previously Article 212) of the Labor Code defines a "labor dispute" as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." As separation pay concerns a term and condition of employment, Noel's request to be guided in the payment thereof is clearly a labor dispute under the Labor Code.

Guagua National Colleges v. CA

 

Facts: Under Section 5(2) of RA No. 6728 (Government Assistance To Students and Teachers In Private Education Act), 70% of the increase in tuition fees shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of the teaching and non-teaching personnel. Pursuant to this provision, the petitioner imposed a 7% increase of its tuition fees for school year 2006-2007.

In order to save the depleting funds of the petitioner's Retirement Plan, its Board of Trustees approved the funding of the retirement program out of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the tuition fee increases. Respondents GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor Union challenged the petitioner's unilateral decision by claiming that the increase violated Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728.

The parties referred the matter to voluntary arbitration. Voluntary Arbitrator Bacungan rendered his decision in favor of GNC. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Extension to the CA which was granted. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and it was acted on by the CA.

Issue: Whether the CA is acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction considering that the decision of the VA had already become final and executory.

Held: No. Accordingly, the decisions and awards of Voluntary Arbitrators, albeit immediately final and executory, remained subject to judicial review in appropriate cases through petitions for certiorari. 

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1- 95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.

This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.

The remedy of appeal by petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court became available to the parties aggrieved by the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panels of Arbitrators.

Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Sto. Tomas

Facts: On May 31, 2002, a petition for certification election was filed by private respondent HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS, alleging that: PIGLAS is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with DOLE, representing HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS; HCCS is a private educational institution duly registered and operating under Philippine laws; there are approximately 120 teachers and employees comprising the proposed appropriate bargaining unit; and HCCS is unorganized, there is no collective bargaining agreement or a duly certified bargaining agent or a labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the proposed bargaining unit within one year prior to the filing of the petition. Among the documents attached to the petition were the certificate of affiliation with PIGLAS-KAMAO issued by BLR, charter certificate issued by PIGLAS-KAMAO, and certificate of registration of HCCS-TELU as a legitimate labor organization issued by the DOLE. 

Petitioner HCCS consistently noted that it is a parochial school with a total of 156 employees. It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 245 of the Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election. Private respondent, however, countered that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that some of the employees included in the petition for certification election holds managerial and supervisory positions.

Med-Arbiter Daquigan denied the petition for certification election on the ground that the unit which private respondent sought to represent is inappropriate. Private respondent appealed before the SOLE, who ruled against the dismissal of the petition and directed the conduct of two separate certification elections for the teaching and the non-teaching personnel. Petitioner filed an MR which was denied. Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. CA eventually dismissed the petition. MR was also denied. 

Issues: 

1. Whether the CA erred in holding that the case in Toyota Motor Phil. Co., v. Toyota Motor Phil. Co., Labor Union does not apply in the case at bar despite the commingling of both supervisory or managerial and rank-and-file employees in the respondent union; and 
2. Whether the CA erred in its conflicting ruling allowing the conduct of certification election by upholding that the respondent union represented a bargaining unit despite its own findings that there is no mutuality of interest between the members of respondent union applying the test laid down in the case of UP v. Ferrer-Calleja.

Held: 

1. No. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold true under the law and rules governing the instant case. The petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) was applied. In contrast, D.O. No. 9 is applicable in the petition for certification election of private respondent as it was filed on May 31, 2002.

2. No. The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit. In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.

The purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain the majority of the employees’ choice of an appropriate bargaining unit – to be or not to be represented by a labor organization and, if in the affirmative case, by which one.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles

Facts: Petitioner is a recruitment and placement agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent Joy C. Cabiles submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan. Joy’s application was accepted. She was required to pay a placement fee when she signed the employment contract. 

Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal on June 26, 1997. She alleged in her employment contract that she agreed to work as a quality control for one year, however, she was asked to work as a cutter. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated. Wacoal deducted her salary to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

Joy filed a complained with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal, claiming she was illegally dismissed. Petitioner also asserted that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to Pacific. Pacific moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims.

The LA dismissed Joy’s complaint. On appeal, the NLRC declared Joy was illegally dismissed. It also denied the agency’s MR. CA affirmed the NLRC decision.

Issue: Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the NLRC decision.

Held: No. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

Employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work. They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards. Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is “tempered with the employee’s right to security of tenure.” Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance assessment. In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to support such allegations.